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INTRODUCTION  
• To advance towards universal coverage, decision-makers have to determine ways to incentivise 
providers and patients alike to increase access to good quality health services and promote efficient 
modes of delivery that can be sustainable.  
 
 
 
PAYING INDIVIDUAL PROVIDERS AND HEALTH CARE FACILITIES  
• According to how they are designed, payment mechanisms generate different economic signals 
which theoretically influence the behaviour of providers. 
• There is little rigorous evidence to guide policymakers on how the theoretical incentives created by 
different payment mechanisms for individual providers (salary, FFS, capitation) or facilities (budgets, 
case-based payments, per diem) operate in practice. 
• The available data does indicate that FFS systems (for individuals or facilities) result in higher rates 
of utilisation and resource use. These mechanisms can therefore be used if the primary objective is 
to increase the volume of services provided, with little concern for cost escalation. 
• Limited evidence on reimbursement mechanisms for facilities suggests that case-based payments 
are efficiency enhancing; however, important questions remain about their impact on quality of 
care and the possibility of implementing them in systems or facilities where capacity is low. 
• The impact of different payment mechanisms depends not only on the incentives generated, but 
also on the capacity of local legal, financial and administrative systems. 
•  
 
 
PAYING  PROVIDERS FOR PERFORMANCE  
• Doubts concerning the effects of these efficiency-enhancing mechanisms on quality of care have 
paved the way for the emergence of pay-for-performance (P4P) mechanisms as a tool to improve 
both quality of care and efficiency of health providers. 
• The evidence in support of P4P at present is mixed. Few significant impacts on quality of care have 
been reported and where they have been found, they have tended to be small in magnitude. 
• Policymakers seeking to implement P4P schemes are advised to proceed with caution. Financial 
incentives have the potential to do harm and careful attention should be given to the design 
of schemes to mitigate these risks. 
• More evaluations of P4P schemes are warranted that estimate impacts on both intended and 
unintended outcomes, and give consideration to the cost of implementing such schemes. 
 
 
 
 
PAYING PATIENTS  
• Conditional cash transfers (CCT) are payments made to households or patients contingent upon 
their completion of certain requirements (e.g. regular check-ups, assisted delivery) 
• CCTs have proved to be effective demand-side incentives to increase the uptake of health services 
in countries where they have been implemented, but this success is likely to be dependent on 
adequate infrastructure, reliable funding and technical capacity. 
• Key questions remain about the desirability and cost-effectiveness of CCTs, in particular in low-
income settings. 
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RESEARCH GAPS  
• The tradeoffs between efficiency of resource use and quality of care for different reimbursement 
mechanisms remain unproven, and need further research.  
• In general, there is a lack of empirical evidence on payment mechanisms from countries that are 
currently concerned with moving towards universal coverage. Evidence from high-income countries 
might not be informative for other settings which differ in terms of resources and policy objectives. 
• The large body of evidence reviewed here suffers from three main methodological gaps: a lack of 
robust evidence on the relative impact of different payment mechanisms; a lack of cost-
effectiveness studies; and a lack of implementation research to inform the favourable contextual 
conditions for change. 
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Executive summary 
 
Health systems that move towards universal coverage seek to provide access to good quality health 
services to all, in a way that promotes an efficient use of resources to remain sustainable. To achieve 
these objectives, decision-makers will have to determine how to pay providers to align their interests 
with those of the patient and the purchaser. In addition, to increase the uptake of health services, 
decision-makers might also want to shape the incentives that are faced by patients.  
This background paper presents an overview of the relative merits and pitfalls of four types of 
mechanisms available to health authorities to pay health care providers or patients in order to improve 
a range of outcomes: remuneration arrangements to pay individual providers; payment mechanisms 
directed at facilities; pay-for-performance incentives; and conditional cash transfers. For the sake of 
clarity, these four mechanisms are presented and discussed separately. But they should not be seen as 
mutually exclusive options given that they often co-exist in a given health system.  
The results presented in this paper draw primarily on existing (systematic) literature reviews of the 
evidence, complemented by recently published experimental or quasi-experimental studies. When such 
rigorous evidence was not available, we considered the findings from controlled observational studies or 
before and after studies. 
The three main methods of reimbursing individual health care workers are salary, fee-for-service (FFS) 
and capitation. In theory, each provider payment mechanism results in economic signals which influence 
provider behaviour in different ways. Salaries provide no incentive to increase effort or the outputs 
produced, but do not encourage over-servicing or patient selection (cream-skimming). FFS payment 
reimburses health providers for each specific service they provide, which gives a clear incentive to 
increase consultations, even if unnecessary. Finally, capitation provides a set payment for each person 
registered with providers which aims to counteract supplier-induced demand and incentivise efficiency, 
but bears the risk that providers might provide lower quality care or avoid enrolling patients who are 
less healthy. 
The available results from empirical studies are mixed, but broadly, FFS remuneration does appear to 
result in higher rates of consultation and increased use of resources when compared with capitation or 
salaried payment. The differences between reimbursement by capitation or salary have been relatively 
trivial. The available studies have not shown any differences in health outcomes among the three 
reimbursement mechanisms. 
There are five main mechanisms that can be used to pay health facilities: budgets (line-item or global 
ones); fee-for-service; payment per day; or case-based payments. There is a dearth of evidence on 
hospital payment mechanisms, with hardly any rigorous evidence and the majority of studies based on 
the experience of a shift from one system to another (mostly from global budgets to adjusted case-
based payments). Still, a few lessons emerge from recent experiences and theory. Line-items budgets 
essentially offer a simple and straightforward way to control allocation of resources, but they are likely 
to lead to a waste of resources, and may promote under-provision of care. Global budgets are useful 
tools to contain costs while allowing some flexibility to facilities, but they may not encourage efficiency 
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of resource use either. Fee-for-service and per-diems will encourage providers to increase the volume of 
inpatient care provided, to the detriment of efficiency of resource use. This can lead to unnecessary 
hospital admissions and, specifically for per-day payments, longer lengths of stay. Case-based payments 
improve efficiency of resources but their impact on quality, volume of care provided and overall costs is 
uncertain.  
Pay for performance (P4P) schemes refer to payment methods that give financial incentives to health 
care providers for improved performance on measures of quality and efficiency. The idea behind P4P is 
that it aligns the incentives of various parties (patients, health providers, purchasers) involved in the 
provision of health care. There has been experience with P4P in the US, the UK and, to a lesser extent, 
other OECD countries. P4P schemes are increasingly being promoted in developing countries, with 
several large pilot schemes under way or in preparation. 
Based on the literature identified, evidence on the effectiveness of P4P mechanisms targeting quality 
improvements is at best mixed and there are substantial methodological weaknesses with existing 
studies. Few significant impacts have been reported and where they are found, they tend to be small in 
magnitude. There are two notable exceptions. High profile P4P schemes in the UK and Rwanda show 
evidence of a positive effect on quality of care, albeit for only a few health conditions. There is almost 
no evidence on the effect of P4P schemes on health outcomes and efficiency. Although limited, 
evidence is beginning to emerge on unintended, typically undesirable, effects of P4P. Examples have 
been reported of gaming, cream-skimming, and detrimental effects on quality of care for health 
conditions not targeted by the incentives. 
Seeking to address financial and cultural barriers preventing people from seeking care, conditional cash 
transfers (CCT) consist in making a transfer of money to households contingent upon their completion of 
certain requirements. Although they are now spreading to lower-income settings, the majority of CCT 
programmes have been implemented in middle-income countries, where they have often been 
introduced as a broad social transfer mechanism investing in human capital. However, CCTs are 
increasingly used to increase the uptake of specific health services, such as assisted deliveries. Relying 
on impact evaluations of an overall good quality, conditional cash transfer programmes have 
demonstrated a series of positive effects on the uptake of health care interventions, although there are 
mixed results on the impact of CCTs to increase immunisation rates. Yet key questions remain with 
regard to their cost-effectiveness and their replicability to poor settings.  
The review of this empirical literature underlines a number of research and methodological gaps in the 
literature. In terms of research questions, there are three areas that have been insufficiently 
investigated. First, there is a lack of empirical evidence from low- and middle-income countries, which 
are the countries primarily concerned with moving towards universal coverage. Evidence on provider 
payment mechanisms from high-income countries might not be informative for these settings, where 
different short-term policy objectives, as well as information, resource and capacity constraints, indicate 
that alternative approaches are required. Second, there remains ample scope for further understanding 
of whether or not P4P schemes work, how they work, and what features are most important in 
determining their effectiveness. Finally, the jury is still out on the desirability (and cost-effectiveness) of 
 7 
 
using conditional cash transfers in settings where targeting is problematic and monitoring is potentially 
difficult and costly. 
In terms of type of studies used, there are three methodological gaps in the literature reviewed. First, 
there is a scarcity of (randomised) controlled studies on the effects of payment mechanisms, which is 
likely driven by significant political and logistical difficulties. Second, there are no cost-effectiveness 
studies comparing alternative mechanisms for paying individual providers, or hospitals. Finally, there is a 
lack of studies describing how best to implement financing reforms and the conditions required to 
support change from one system to another. 
Despite these gaps, a series of policy recommendations emerge from this empirical evidence. FFS 
remuneration (for individuals or hospitals) and per diem should be used if the primary objective is to 
increase the volume of services provided. However, these mechanisms typically increase the use of 
resources and are unlikely to provide sustainable options. When policy-makers are concerned primarily 
by gains in efficiency and cost control, the use of hospital case-mix adjusted global budgeting and 
capitation for primary care providers have often emerged as good options. Doubts concerning the 
effects of these efficiency-enhancing mechanisms on quality of care have paved the way for the 
emergence of pay-for-performance mechanisms as a tool to improve both quality of care and efficiency 
of health providers. Yet, given how little is still known on the effects of P4P, policymakers should 
proceed with caution as they can trigger unintended effects and gaming behaviours. Besides, the idea of 
paying incentives on the basis of quality of care is technically demanding, requiring highly sophisticated 
information technology and monitoring systems. The same caveat should be borne in mind when 
considering the implementation of conditional cash transfers. Although they are appealing solutions, 
their cost-effectiveness remains unproven and they should only be considered as a policy option if 
barriers to universal access to health primarily lie on the demand-side. Ultimately, a mixture of 
reimbursement mechanisms and incentives is required to mitigate the unintended consequences of 
single mechanisms. This requires careful design, tailored to the local health system and market realities, 
as well as active monitoring and management.  
Following this overview of the current state of evidence, a number of research priorities should be taken 
forward to inform the policy debates on universal coverage. On individual payment mechanisms, the 
two urgent questions relate to the relative (yet unproven) advantage of capitation over salaries for 
public sector employees, and to the potential trade-off between the efficiency gains generated by some 
remuneration systems and quality of care. For hospital payment mechanisms, more rigorous research is 
needed from low- and middle-income countries to understand the effects of different mechanisms on 
quality of care, and to assess the relative impact of budgets versus case-based payments. Researchers 
interested in P4P should contribute to the currently small number of well-designed interventions, in 
particular from low-resource countries, and extend that to investigate the cost of P4P and its impact on 
health workers’ intrinsic motivation. Finally, research on CCTs should focus on their cost-effectiveness 
compared to other (supply-side) interventions and on the relative advantages of conditioning transfers 
or not.  
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Managing incentives for health providers and patients  
in the move towards universal coverage 
 
1. Background  
1.1. Introduction 
Moving towards universal coverage usually means that countries aim to embrace a new health financing 
architecture in order to provide access to health services for all. This new architecture can refer to 
health systems adopting predominantly one or a mix of two health financing models. The first is a health 
system where tax revenue is the main source of funding for health services that are typically delivered 
by public and sometimes contracted private providers. The second one relies on a system where 
workers and employers are required to pay contributions into a social health insurance fund that 
employs and/or contracts health care providers to deliver services.  
In low-resource settings, various social and macro-economic obstacles prevent countries from 
establishing social health insurance or relying on tax-financed systems to cover the entire population. 
Yet, with growing pressure to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, all countries have been 
encouraged to ensure universal access to cost-effective public health interventions, such as the delivery 
of insecticide-treated nets or immunisation programmes [1]. Hence the term “universal coverage” has 
sometimes been used in this context, referring to the objective of actions taken to scale up priority 
interventions (i.e., providing access to all) [1, 2]. 
Although they are radically different in terms of scope and the organisational changes they involve, both 
approaches to “universal coverage” ultimately have similar objectives. First, they aim to offer equitable 
access to essential health services, so that fundamental health needs can be met for all. Second, they 
promote an efficient use of resources, encouraging, for example, the adoption of cost-effective 
interventions [1]. Finally, they both aim to provide health care services of good quality. In order to 
achieve these objectives, policy-makers need to determine the most adequate health care delivery 
system, which consists of choosing the organisational and financial arrangements that will create the 
desired incentives for all actors involved. This background paper focuses on issues raised by some 
aspects of the financial arrangements.  
The behaviour of health care providers determines to a large extent the quality and efficiency of health 
services provided in a system. Therefore, moving towards universal care requires creating the 
appropriate incentives for health care providers (either individuals or institutions) that will ensure that 
an adequate quantity of services is provided, that the quality of these services is good, and that an 
efficient use of financial resources is made. To achieve this triple objective, governments can use 
different approaches to remunerating health care providers and incentivising patients. 
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At the same time, granting access to health for all means that all categories of the population must have 
equal opportunities to access care when they need it. To achieve this, it may sometimes be necessary to 
overcome the barriers preventing disadvantaged groups from accessing services. Financial mechanisms 
can be used to increase the demand of health services to a level deemed beneficial for society as a 
whole. This is particularly true for preventive services, such as immunisations, that are typically under-
valued by individuals but whose consumption creates beneficial spillovers (or externalities) to the whole 
population.  
In other words, when thinking about ways to disburse funds to pay for or purchase health services, 
decision-makers might consider mechanisms that target either the demand or the supply of health 
services. In order to inform policy-makers who seek to move towards universal coverage, we set out to 
review the evidence on the effects of the main payment mechanisms used on the supply-side and the 
demand-side. Ultimately, this overview paper seeks to bring to the attention of policy-makers the 
incentives directed at providers or patients that are created by certain payment mechanisms and recent 
health financing innovations, with a view to understanding the extent to which they can contribute to 
the achievement of universal coverage.  
1.2. Conceptual framework 
The behaviours of providers and patients are driven by a wide range of factors. Figure 1 provides a 
conceptual framework showing these different determinants schematically for both providers and 
patients.  
To deliver health services to the population, governments (or public entities) rely on health care 
providers to deliver services. The effort health workers make to provide such services is driven by a large 
series of factors, including training, regulation, professional and ethical norms, financial incentives, 
working conditions, reputation effects and altruism. In addition, providers’ decisions are also shaped by 
the characteristics of the broader environment of the health care market, such as its degree of 
competition. These different factors form a broad network of incentives, which can be influenced more 
or less easily and quickly by governments to improve providers’ performance and achieve particular 
policy objectives [3].  
According to the principal-agent theory, health care providers act as agents for the principal who hires 
them to deliver health services to the population on his behalf. Economic theory identifies several 
problems arising from the principal-agent relationship that can compromise the objectives of universal 
coverage. First, if agents act according to their self-interest, they might try to shirk or work less diligently 
for a given level of remuneration. This can have a detrimental impact on the quality of services and the 
volume of services offered to the population. Second, if they have a financial incentive to cut costs, 
agents might avoid treating patients that require more resource-intensive treatment. This problem, 
called “cream-skimming”, can arise if agents receive a fixed amount of money per patient treated, while 
there might be a wide distribution of costs and efforts required to attend patients. This obviously 
threatens equal access to health services. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework  
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Third, although the principal expects them to provide good quality services using the most cost-
effective approaches, if providers do not bear the financial costs of the services provided, they will 
not necessarily take costs into account or try to use resources efficiently. Finally, if the agent derives 
a direct financial benefit each time she delivers a medical service or performs a clinical procedure, 
she may be encouraged to perform or prescribe unnecessary medical acts, by using her influence on 
patients and the asymmetry of information to her advantage. This phenomenon is called supplier-
induced demand and could lead to escalating health care costs. 
All of these issues are likely to compromise the efficient use of resources and to impede universal 
coverage. To try to reduce these risks, a contract should be drawn up between the two parties to 
align the objectives of the principal (the purchaser) and the agent. Although contracts between 
purchasers of services and providers encompass various critical aspects (scope of the contract, 
regulatory framework, etc.), payment modalities are often seen as the most critical aspect [4].There 
is a wide variety of payment mechanisms that policy-makers can choose to purchase health services 
from health care providers. Payments can be linked to inputs, services provided, population covered 
or particular performance targets, and they differ in how and when the payment is set and made 
(see typology in Table 1). Each of these mechanisms is expected to exert different types of incentives 
on providers, generating both potential benefits and drawbacks.  
Table 1: Typology of payment mechanisms 
  Input-based 
payments 
Service-based 
payments 
Population-
based payments 
Performance-
based payments 
Primary care / 
individual providers 
Salary Fee-for-service  Capitation Pay-for-
performance  
Secondary care / 
health facilities 
Fixed (annual) 
budget 
Fee-for-
service, per-day 
or case-based 
payments 
Block contract Pay-for-
performance 
Source: adapted from [5] 
 
Obstacles to reaching universal coverage of health care interventions can also appear on the 
demand-side, when, despite the availability of good quality essential services, parts of the 
population may be unable or choose not to use health services. For example, there is ample 
evidence from industrialised and developing countries depicting the low use of preventive and 
curative health services by disadvantaged populations [6].  
The framework in Figure 1 highlights some of the factors that are known to drive the demand for 
health services. Patients’ decisions are driven by a wide range of factors, such as education, 
knowledge of the benefits of interventions, cultural factors, costs associated with seeking care, and 
supply-side aspects such as quality of care or geographical access of health services. The cost of 
accessing health care has received a lot of attention in the literature on demand for health services 
[7]. In addition to the direct costs of care when individuals are charged user fees, the demand for 
health services can be negatively affected by indirect costs (e.g. travel time) or the opportunity cost 
incurred whilst seeking care (corresponding to the loss of revenue sustained during the visit to the 
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health provider). For preventive services, lack of awareness of their benefits has often been found to 
be another major obstacle to universal coverage of essential preventive interventions, such as 
immunisation or pre-natal services [8]. Finally, intra-households dynamics and women’s lack of 
bargaining power can lead to under-consumption of health services by children or women [8].  
In order to address these issues and the resulting under-utilisation of services, some countries have 
made use of demand-side conditional financial incentives designed to encourage individuals or 
households to increase use of health services, in particular preventive services. With such 
mechanisms, usually referred to as “conditional cash transfers” (CCTs), individuals receive some 
payments if they use health services.  
With respect to achieving universal coverage of interventions, CCTs can be seen as a useful 
complementary tool to broader health care delivery interventions and provider payments. When 
households are required to bring their children for regular check-ups in order to receive the cash 
transfer, the programme expects that this will allow cost-effective interventions, such as 
immunisation programmes, to reach those populations that would not otherwise come to health 
facilities. In this way, the authorities ensure that a socially optimal uptake of essential interventions 
is reached [9].  
1.3. Scope of the paper 
This background paper aims to present an overview of the relative merits and pitfalls of some of the 
financial mechanisms available to health authorities to allocate or transfer their financial resources 
to purchase health services from providers or increase the coverage of public health interventions. 
In the health systems literature, “strategic purchasing” usually refers to arrangements that 
determine the allocation of funds to provider organizations. These arrangements are typically 
broken down into a series of individual elements such as contracts employed, payment systems or 
provider competition [10]. Considering the vast body of work potentially related to this topic, this 
overview is restricted to a specific aspect, namely the payment systems used in various purchasing 
arrangements. Consequently, several areas from the broader health financing literature are 
excluded from this review. For example, the literature on contracting out was beyond the scope of 
this paper. Indeed, contracting out refers more to the organisational and contractual arrangement 
agreed between health authorities and private providers to deliver health services. Within this 
contractual arrangement, different types of payment mechanisms can be used by the fund-holder (in 
this case the private organisation that has been contracted out) to pay individual providers or health 
facilities.  
In addition, this paper focuses on the different ways purchasers can pay health care providers (or 
patients) to improve a range of outcomes. Therefore, user charges, which are payments made by 
patients at the point of delivery of services, are excluded from this overview, although we 
acknowledge that they are an important health financing arrangement that has consequences for 
universal coverage and access to health services in general [11, 12]. Evidence on the effects of 
decreasing or removing user fees can be found in a number of recent literature reviews [13-15].  
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To summarise, this overview is restricted to the following specific issues:  
Firstly, the scope of the paper is restricted to certain payment mechanisms, those that are most 
widely used or have recently attracted significant attention: 
- Remuneration arrangements used to pay health care providers, either individual providers 
(namely salary, fee-for-service or capitation) or health facilities (budgeting, case-based 
payments); 
- Payment mechanisms conditional on specific performance targets, also called pay-for-
performance mechanisms; these mechanisms have been used as payment mechanisms for 
individuals as well as facilities.  
- Financial incentives directed at patients to increase the uptake of specific health services 
(conditional cash transfers).  
This choice is justified by the importance these payment mechanisms have had in the strengthening 
of health systems in developed or developing countries. 
Secondly, mechanisms used to purchase services from health care providers usually refer to 
processes “by which those who hold financial resources allocate them to those who produce 
services” [4]. As such, they are influenced by a wide range of characteristics that shape their 
functioning and their effects: institutional arrangements; accountability mechanisms; 
reimbursement system; market environment; etc. Although this overview sometimes touches on 
some of these other aspects, in particular the contexts in which mechanisms have been operating, 
we mainly focus on the incentives and effects created by payment systems on health care provider 
or patient behaviour.  
Finally, although this paper discusses the different payment mechanisms separately for the sake of 
clarity, this is not to imply that purchasers of health care in any health system should use 
predominantly one mechanism or another. In fact, many health systems around the world are 
characterised by multiple payment mechanisms that co-exist together, linked to a plurality of actors 
and objectives.  
2. Methodology 
The financial incentives of focus in this chapter are mechanisms for reimbursing individual providers, 
different ways of paying health facilities, pay-for-performance initiatives, and conditional cash 
transfers. We set out to review the available empirical evidence on the effects of these various 
incentive mechanisms on health system outcomes of relevance to achieving universal coverage (see 
Figure 1). The impact on the uptake and coverage of health services was relevant for all four types of 
mechanisms, while for provider payment mechanisms, we also investigated the effects on the 
efficiency and quality of services provided.  
The overview presented in this paper draws primarily on existing reviews of the evidence. We 
prioritised reviews that could be considered systematic in that they undertook a thorough search for 
relevant papers and critically evaluated the methodological quality of the studies identified.  
The databases and search terms used to identify relevant literature reviews and empirical studies 
are summarised in Box 1. The searches were not limited in geographical scope, as evidence was 
sought from both high-income as well as low- and middle-income countries. Identified reviews for 
 14 
 
each mechanism are described and briefly presented in the Appendix in Tables A2 (individual 
provider remuneration methods), A4 (hospital payment mechanisms), A6 (pay-for-performance) and 
A9 (conditional cash transfers). 
Box 1: Review search strategy 
Search terms: Remuneration mechanisms “reimbursement mechanisms”, “fee for service”, 
“salary”, “capitation”, “fee payments”, “case-
based payment”, “diagnosis-related groups”, 
“DRG” , “hospital reimbursement” 
 
 Pay-for-performance “pay for performance”, “performance-based”, 
“results-based”, “output-based”, “performance 
incentive”, “conditional payment” 
 
 Conditional cash transfers “conditional cash transfer”, “cash transfer”, 
“output-based financing”, demand-side 
incentives”, “results-based incentives”. 
 
Databases: PudMed, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Ovid, Econlit, Science Direct, 
Popline, EMBASE 
 
 
We also tried to identify recently-published studies that had not been included in the reviews. In 
addition to sifting through the results of the literature searches, a snow-balling approach was used 
to identify related studies. Articles deemed relevant were reviewed and their bibliographies used to 
identify further articles.  
Since we were mostly interested in assessing the effects of different mechanisms on a range of 
outcomes, we considered the rigorous study designs recommended by the Effective Practice and 
Organisation of Care Group (EPOC); namely, randomised controlled trials (RCTs), interrupted time 
series (ITS), and controlled before-and-after studies (CBAs). When we failed to identify such studies, 
or when they failed to investigate certain aspects, we also considered the findings from controlled 
observational studies or before and after studies.  
Each of the financial incentives of interest is discussed in turn, and each section follows a similar 
structure. First, we present the mechanisms, their rationale and expected effects – both positive and 
negative. Following a brief overview of experiences to date, we then summarise the available 
empirical evidence of their effects on relevant outcomes (health care utilisation, quality of health 
care, cost and efficiency of resource use, and health outcomes). We conclude each section by 
reflecting on issues that may influence the effects of each mechanism (modifying factors), and 
factors that might mitigate their feasibility and acceptability (local applicability) [16]. The discussion 
section of this chapter concludes by drawing together the findings, implications for policy, and the 
implications for research across all four areas.  
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3. Paying individual providers 
This section aims to describe the features of the different mechanisms that have been used to 
reimburse individual health providers, review the available evidence on the relative impact of 
different mechanisms on key health outputs and outcomes, and highlight some important remaining 
issues when it comes to choosing the best mechanism for paying individual providers. 
3.1. Reimbursement mechanisms and related incentives 
The three main methods of reimbursing individual health care workers are salary, fee-for-service 
(FFS) and capitation. Other mechanisms such as sessional payment, case payment or withhold 
payment are possible but are encountered less frequently [17]. Paying individual providers for 
achieving specified results, or targets (pay for performance), is a newer reimbursement mechanism 
increasing in popularity which is discussed in detail in Section 5 below.  
Each provider payment mechanism results in economic signals which influence provider behaviour in 
different ways. Table 2 summarises the key characteristics of the different reimbursement 
mechanisms as well as the intended and unintended incentives they create. 
Salary  
In this approach, health care providers are paid for the time that they work (time-based payment), 
such as when they are employed by the national health system or health funder and are paid a fixed 
salary each month to provide health care services. Providers are paid for the inputs they provide 
rather than the outputs or health outcomes they produce. The payment is made at a rate agreed 
upon in advance.  
Since salaries do not link remuneration to the volume of activities provided, there is no incentive to 
increase effort or the outputs produced. However, the opportunity for promotion (and increased 
salaries) could be related to performance and, as such, would introduce an incentive for increasing 
physicians’ efforts. Advantages of salaried remuneration are that, unlike FFS, there is no incentive to 
provide unnecessary health services; and that, unlike capitation, there is no incentive for providers 
to compete for patients or select patients who require less expensive treatment.  
Fee-for-service 
This involves reimbursing health care providers for each specific service they provide (service-based 
payment). The health professional is usually paid a basic consultation fee to which are added the 
costs of each additional service provided to the patient (diagnostic tests, surgical procedures etc). 
Reimbursement occurs after the service has been provided. The schedule of fees to be paid may or 
may not be standardised, and may or may not be agreed upon in advance between the provider and 
the health care funder or patient.  
Providers are paid for each consultation and all of their inputs. Therefore, in order to maximise their 
revenue, there is a clear incentive for providers to increase the number of consultations and to 
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provide more services.  If unchecked, FFS health professionals may provide more services than are 
medically necessary (over-servicing). Patients typically do not have the medical knowledge to 
counteract this supplier-induced demand, but may also have no incentive to do so if the services 
provided are covered by health insurance, which is usually the case in FFS systems (a problem known 
as moral hazard).  
Capitation 
Capitation is a population-based payment system where providers are paid an amount of money for 
each member registered with them. The provider is contracted to provide a specified package of 
services to their members continuously over a specified period of time (generally one year). The 
capitation rate is set in advance and payment also usually occurs prospectively. Provider revenue is 
not related to the inputs used but to the number of members covered.  
The intention of capitation systems is to counteract supplier-induced demand and to incentivise 
providers to use resources as efficiently as possible in providing care. But, in order to maximise their 
profit, there are now incentives for providers to increase the number of members covered, to 
decrease the amount and cost of services provided to each member, and to try and refer members 
requiring expensive care to other providers. However, capitation systems usually have controls on 
the number of members registered with each provider and restrictions on referrals. Also, excessive 
under-servicing would be counter-productive as it could lead to more complicated health problems 
requiring more expensive treatment later. Indeed, there would clearly be an incentive for providers 
to keep their members healthy and to prevent health problems before they occur. But this would 
also mean that providers would try and be selective in the members accepted for capitation 
reimbursement, preferring younger and healthier members (risk selection).  
3.2. Experiences to date 
The provider reimbursement mechanism is a key characteristic of a country’s health financing 
system. However, it is not uncommon for a mixture of different provider payment mechanisms to be 
used in one country – in different sectors or even within the same sector. Provider reimbursement 
has also been the target of health sector reform initiatives in a range of countries, resulting in 
significant changes in the remuneration of individual health providers over time. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, FFS is used in the private sector, while the National Health System (NHS) pays 
hospital doctors a salary and primary care general practitioners by capitation [18], although general 
practitioners have also been paid by FFS and salary at different points in the history of the NHS [19]. 
Payment by salary is used to pay hospital doctors providing inpatient care in many countries. Salary 
is also used for public-sector primary care providers in a range of countries, including Finland, 
Portugal, India, Indonesia and Israel [20]. Not surprisingly, most countries in this group have 
significant restrictions on the private practice of full-time salaried doctors. However, performance-
related bonuses have been used to incentivise certain clinical activities.  
Fee-for-service remuneration is typical of countries relying on the private sector such as the United 
States, but is also used in countries such as France, Belgium and Germany that have social health 
insurance systems which contract with self-employed doctors for primary care [21], and it is even 
how primary care doctors are paid in the national health systems of Canada and Norway. The fee 
 17 
 
schedule in classical FFS systems such as the United States is determined by the market. However, 
publicly-funded FFS remuneration usually occurs according to a predetermined fee schedule. The fee 
schedule may be compulsory, such as in Germany, or only a recommended price list, such as in 
France and Belgium [22]. Other initiatives to reduce over-servicing and control costs in open FFS 
systems include pre-authorisation requirements, utilisation review, and limiting patient choice to 
selected providers. In mixed remuneration systems, FFS may be used to incentivise priority 
preventive services such as immunisation or the provision of health care in under-served areas. 
Interestingly, some of the performance-based financing (PBF) schemes being promoted in low-
income countries are essentially FFS systems, with or without additional quality stipulations [23]. It 
has been argued in these contexts that FFS is an improvement over traditional salary remuneration, 
because it focuses on outputs rather than inputs [24]. 
Capitation is a more recent reimbursement mechanism and is used to pay primary care providers in 
the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy [25]. Simple capitation systems pay the 
same rate for all members, but risk-adjusted capitation systems are more typical [22]. In many 
middle- and high-income countries, the focus of financing reforms has been on shifting the financing 
risk from funder to provider, through the bundling of services or the use of capitation [26]. For 
example, capitation has been introduced in Canada and for Medicaid services in the United States, 
where FFS has previously been the dominant model [27, 28]. The expansion of universal coverage 
through the introduction of social health insurance systems in many middle-income countries in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia has only been possible by shifting to capitation-based 
systems for paying primary care providers [29-34]. For example, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Slovakia, Hungary, Costa Rica and Argentina have all significantly increased 
the proportion of individual provider remuneration occurring through capitation.  
3.3. Evidence of effects 
In this section, we review the available empirical evidence in support of the expected effects 
summarised in Table 2. 
There are a number of reviews on alternative mechanisms for paying individual providers [For 
example: 25, 34, 35, 36-40], but only four that could be considered systematic reviews (see Table A2 
in Appendix). A Cochrane review was last conducted in 2000 [41], but an updated review is currently 
being conducted by Scott et al [42].  
There are only a small number of primary empirical studies comparing the effects of payment by 
salary, FFS or capitation [43]. Only six studies with rigorous study designs could be identified (see 
Table A3 in Appendix). All of these studies focused on primary care doctors in high-income countries. 
Four of the available studies compare FFS with salary, one contrasts FFS with capitation, and the 
final study compares salary with capitation (Table A3). There is also a larger group of studies which 
have investigated these questions using observational designs.  
Impact on service use 
Overall, the studies summarised in Table A3 show that the behaviour of doctors is influenced by how 
they are paid, though the demonstrated effects have not always corresponded with theoretical 
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predictions. In terms of the possible impacts of different reimbursement mechanisms, the available 
studies have largely focused on clinical service provision.  
When compared with salaried payment, FFS did result in higher rates of consultation [44]. However, 
patients of salaried physicians had more emergency room visits than those of FFS doctors. The 
studies comparing FFS with capitation showed that FFS resulted in significantly more clinical 
consultations. In Denmark, for example, GPs dramatically increased the number of diagnostic and 
curative services per patient when they changed from capitation to FFS [45]. The differences in rates 
of referral and hospitalisation between FFS and capitation were less consistent. One study showed 
significantly higher rates of specialist and hospital referral for capitation physicians consistent with 
the predicted theoretical incentives [45], but two studies found lower rates in the capitation group 
[46, 47], and the last study found no significant difference between capitation and FFS [48]. In the 
study by Gosden et al [19] in the UK, salaried general practitioners (GPs) has shorter consultations 
and lower prescribing rates than GPs paid by capitation, but these differences were not statistically 
significant. The referral rates of the two groups were also similar.  
Observational studies have confirmed that FFS is associated with more consultations, shorter 
consultations, more procedures, and less preventive care when compared with payment by salary or 
capitation [17]. For example, the case-control study by Johnsen and Holtedahl [49] in Norway 
confirmed that general practitioners (GPs) paid by FFS had more face-to-face and telephonic 
consultations, shorter consultations on average, and fewer home visits than salaried GPs. Aubin et al 
[50] compared salaried and FFS GPs over two years in Canada and found that the salaried doctors 
were 3.7 times more likely to provide hypertensive screening. In one of the few empirical studies 
from low- and middle-income countries, Broomberg and Price [51] demonstrated that GPs paid by 
salary in an health maintenance organisation in South Africa had fewer consultations, requested 
fewer diagnostic tests, and had lower hospitalisation rates than GPs in a traditional FFS scheme. 
Weaker evidence derives from studies that have asked doctors how they would manage certain 
hypothetical clinical scenarios under different reimbursement mechanisms [52, 53]. However, these 
studies clearly demonstrate that doctors modify their clinical decision-making when faced with 
financial incentives to reduce resources. 
Impact on quality of care 
Few studies have attempted to evaluate the impact of different provider reimbursement 
mechanisms on quality of care. When compared with salaried payment, FFS has been shown to 
improve the continuity of care [44], and increase compliance with guidelines on the number of 
patient visits. The same study found no significant differences in overall patient satisfaction, but FFS 
patients did report lower satisfaction with access to their physician. The UK GP study found no 
differences in patient reports of the quality of care between the capitation and salary groups. 
There is no evidence indicating differences in health outcomes between the different payment 
mechanisms. In a randomised controlled trial, Lurie et al [47] demonstrated that health outcomes 
did not differ between elderly Medicaid patients randomised to capitation versus FFS plans. A 
number of observational studies have also investigated the health outcomes of Medicaid patients in 
the United States in prepaid capitation schemes compared to FFS [27, 34, 54, 55]. Overall, these 
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studies have not shown significant differences in health outcomes despite the cost-cutting incentives 
of capitation [56].  
Table 2: Theory and evidence on the effects of mechanisms to reimburse individual providers 
Mechanism Expected benefits Expected pitfalls 
Salary • Cheaper remuneration and no supplier-
induced demand result in lower system costs 
∅ 
• Decreased motivation and effort of providers 
∅ 
• No financial incentive to improve the quality of 
care provided ∅ 
• Expenditure has no impact on provider 
remuneration, so there is no incentive to use 
resources efficiently ∅ 
 
Fee-for-
Service 
• Increased motivation and effort of providers ⊕ 
• Increased quantity of services provided ⊕⊕ 
• Provide higher quality of care because no 
incentive to cut costs ∅ 
• Patients are more satisfied with the services 
they receive ⊕ 
• Providers will provide unnecessary services to 
increase revenue (over-servicing) ∅ 
• Usual association with insurance system results 
in moral hazard problems and further over-
servicing ∅ 
• No incentives to use more efficient mix of 
resources ∅ 
• Providers will decrease costs of the inputs they 
use in order to maximise profit ∅ 
• No incentive to provide unremunerated 
services such as preventive care ⊕ 
 
Capitation • Incentive to increase coverage ∅ 
• Providers will use more efficient mix of 
resources ∅ 
• Increased attention to prevention ⊕ 
• Improved health outcomes in the long-run ∅ 
• Incentive to decrease services provided; results 
in under-servicing and lower quality of care ⊗ 
• Providers will decrease costs of the inputs they 
use in order to maximise profit ∅ 
• If possible, providers will refer costly patients 
to other providers ∅ 
• Providers will attempt to select healthier 
enrolees (risk selection) ∅ 
• Patient concerns about cost-containment 
results in lower satisfaction with the services 
they receive ⊕ 
 
Source: Expected effects based on  [34] 
Note: ∅ means there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis ; ⊕ means there is limited evidence of 
low/moderate quality supporting the hypothesis ; ⊕⊕ means there is good quality evidence supporting the 
theoretical assumption; ⊗ means there is limited evidence of low/moderate quality contradicting the 
hypothesis ; ⊗⊗ means there is good quality evidence contradicting the theoretical assumption 
 
Impact on efficiency  
There is also no rigorous evidence on the impact of provider reimbursement on costs or efficiency. 
Davidson et al [46] undertook some modelling based on their results which suggested, counter-
intuitively, that capitation was more expensive than FFS. The study by Lurie et al [47] in the US found 
the opposite, but again did not test whether or not the difference was statistically significant.  
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Other impacts 
In terms of the possible impacts of different reimbursement mechanisms, the available studies have 
largely focused on clinical behaviour (Table A2 and A3 in the Appendix), so there is very little 
available evidence on the impact of provider reimbursement mechanisms on provider satisfaction, 
patient selection or equity [17]. 
3.4. Discussion 
Not only is the existing evidence base rather limited, but a number of important issues have received 
inadequate attention in the literature to date. There is no perfect system for remunerating individual 
providers – all mechanisms have advantages and disadvantages, and there are well-functioning 
country systems based on salary, FFS and capitation [20]. The actual impact of different 
reimbursement mechanisms depends on the details of their design, their suitability to local contexts, 
and the management of their implementation.    
 Modifying factors 
The design of individual provider reimbursement mechanisms has become increasingly complex and 
few countries use the simple salary, FFS or capitation models described in Section 3.1. As discussed 
in Section 3.2, health systems have modified the basic reimbursement designs in an attempt to 
manage the known negative incentives produced by each mechanism. Some common adjustments 
include adding performance bonuses to salary payment, reimbursing bundles of services by FFS, or 
using risk-adjusted capitation systems.  
Mixed reimbursement systems are frequently encountered in Europe, Asia and Latin America. In 
Hungary, for example, primary care providers are mainly remunerated through a risk-related 
capitation system, but also get a core allowance for infrastructure, receive case-based payments for 
non-registered members, and are paid FFS for specified preventive services [30]. In a number of 
countries there are also multiple purchasers of care each with their own reimbursement systems 
and rules [25]. The incentives for providers in these complex reimbursement designs are much more 
complicated to predict and manage.     
An important determinant of the effects of reimbursement mechanisms is the actual rate of 
reimbursement. The strength of the economic signal depends on the relative difference between 
income and costs. For example, in a FFS environment, the incentive for over-servicing is only present 
if the fees are higher than the input costs, and in a capitation system, there is little incentive for 
efficiency if the capitation rate is too high. Getting the prices right is a critical aspect of 
reimbursement design whichever mechanism is used.  
The impact of different reimbursement mechanisms will be influenced by local market 
characteristics, such as the degree of competition among providers, or the relative power of funders 
and doctors [39]. For example, quality improvements in capitation systems are driven by the 
competition among providers for members, and it may be difficult to negotiate a cost-efficient fee 
schedule in FFS systems where providers are organised and powerful.   
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Local applicability 
Whatever the perceived advantages of a particular payment mechanism, policymakers do not, 
unfortunately, have a completely free hand in designing provider reimbursement systems. The 
historical development of a country’s health system and the current institutional arrangements are a 
significant constraint on radical reform [10]. In all reimbursement systems, providers get used to the 
way they are paid, and are opposed to change [20]. Health professionals are a powerful lobby group 
in many countries so the implementation of reimbursement reform will require skilled actor 
management [57].  
The impact of a particular reimbursement mechanism is not only determined by the incentives 
produced, but also by the legal, financial and management systems required to support it [58]. Most 
changes in provider reimbursement require political authority, legislative reform, and quality 
information for decision-making. In terms of administration, different mechanisms have significantly 
different transaction costs; salaried payments are relatively simple to design and administer, 
capitation fees may be complicated to calculate but the system is not too difficult to administer, 
while FFS systems require agreement on a fee schedule and complex administration systems for 
both providers and purchasers [22, 58]. The feasibility of implementing reimbursement reforms will 
depend on the local capacity to manage such processes.  
There are questions, also, about the generalisability of findings from one setting to another. 
Individual provider behaviour is not only influenced by financial incentives, but by professional and 
ethical norms that may vary between contexts. So FFS systems may work well where ethical 
standards against over-servicing are enforced, but where norms and regulation are weak, FFS could 
result in fraudulent behaviour and excessive costs.  
 
4. Paying facilities 
This section presents the main mechanisms that have been used to pay health facilities (hospitals or 
clinics) for the services they deliver.  
4.1. Reimbursement mechanisms and related incentives 
Five main mechanisms can be used to pay health facilities: budgets (line-item or global ones); fee-
for-service; payment per day; or payment per case. Facilities can refer to hospitals providing 
secondary care, but also, in low-income settings, to health centres providing primary care services.  
Budgets 
With budget payments, the facility receives prospectively a set amount of money to provide health 
services for a given period of time (typically a year). The amount allocated is generally calculated on 
the budget allocated the year before, adjusted for inflation. There are two types of budgets, which 
differ in the degree of flexibility they grant to facilities: line-item and global budgets.  
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Line-item budgets specify prospectively the amount of money that can be spent for the various 
inputs used in the delivery of health services (e.g. salaries, medical supplies, medicines, food, etc.). 
Since they generally include rules limiting the ability of managers to move money across budget 
lines, such budgets prevent initiatives that could seek to use the most efficient input mix. Positive 
aspects of line-item budgets might include strong central control when management capacity at 
facility level is considered weak, predictable levels of spending, and allowing facilities to meet 
minimum standards.  
Global budgets constitute a more flexible alternative since hospital managers are free to define the 
mix of resources they want with the lump sum of money they receive to provide services for a given 
period. Like line-item budgets, the payment is set and made prospectively, and the overall amount 
can be fixed according to historical levels of inputs or outputs. Despite their greater flexibility, global 
budgets do not provide much incentive to optimise efficiency.  
In both systems, a critical question is whether facilities are allowed to keep any remaining surplus at 
the end of the period (or cover any shortfall). If they have such financial autonomy, hospitals might 
be encouraged to ration health services to make sure that their expenses remain within their 
budget, and/or refer to other health care providers.  
Fee-for-service or cost-based payment 
Facilities that are paid FFS receive a set amount of money from the purchaser (e.g. the third party 
payer) for every service they provide (e.g. consultations, drugs used, examinations carried out, food 
provided, etc.). Since it is meant to cover the facility costs, this mechanism is sometimes called 
“retrospective cost-based” payment. In some cases, services can be bundled together and a fee is 
set prospectively to reimburse a set of services that contributes to a particular output (e.g. ante-
natal pregnancy care). 
The incentives for facilities are the same as the ones created for individual providers: facilities are 
encouraged to increase the number of services provided, possibly beyond the necessary level of care 
(supplier-induced demand). This is why this system is often thought to lead to escalating costs, since 
providers have no incentive to try and contain the costs borne by the payer. On the other hand, FFS 
can be used to promote utilisation of services, as has been the case in some low-income countries.  
At the same time, for each service provided, facilities can be encouraged to minimise efforts and 
inputs, to maximise the difference between their costs and the fixed fee. 
Per-day payments 
When hospitals receive per-day payments (or per diem), they receive a fixed amount of money for 
each day spent by patients in hospitals. The amount they receive is set prospectively, based on an 
average cost per bed-day, which can sometimes be adjusted to reflect regional, patient or clinical 
characteristics.  
The dominant incentive in this system is to increase unnecessarily the number of days of inpatient 
care. This translates into more admissions of less seriously-ill patients and longer average lengths of 
hospital stay, in particular as inpatient care consumes fewer resources towards the end of a stay. To 
limit these perverse incentives, per-day payments can be differentiated according to stages in the 
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hospital stay (earlier days being paid at a higher rate). Per-day payments also encourage the 
reduction in intensity of care and resources used during each bed-day, although this could also be 
seen as increasing the efficiency of care.  
Case-based payments 
In this system, facilities receive a payment, usually after the services have been delivered, for every 
case or discharge, regardless of the actual costs incurred. As with per-day payments, there are two 
simultaneous incentives. First, facilities are encouraged to minimise the inputs used on each case, 
for example by limiting the length of stay. There is a risk that this behaviour might compromise 
quality of care. Second, the payment mechanism might encourage hospitals to discriminate amongst 
patients, by increasing admissions of less severe cases (for whom the fixed-price per case is above 
their marginal cost) and/or decreasing admissions of more resource-intensive cases (for whom the 
fixed-price per case is below their marginal cost) [59].  
To limit this latter problem, most of these payment systems have introduced complex adjustments 
to reflect variations in the efforts and costs incurred by different pathologies or cases (case rates, 
fixed prospectively, can also adjust for variations in regional costs). In such cases, facilities allocate 
each patient to a particular case group (called Diagnostic-Related Group in the US system). In turn, 
this might create an incentive for hospitals to game the coding system of cases. Indeed, by allocating 
patients to more rewarding groups than they actually belong to (a practice often called “DRG 
creep”), they can increase their revenue without increasing efficiency [60]. 
4.2. Experiences to date 
Line-item budgets were very popular in the former Soviet Union, Central Asian and Eastern 
European countries before they embarked on a transition from a centrally planned health service 
model to more decentralised systems [5, 61]. Due to the rigidity and the inefficiencies they create, 
line-item budgets have largely been abandoned, although they are still used in many low-income 
settings where inadequate management capacity at facility-level and limited information systems 
restrict the possibility of implementing more complicated payment mechanisms.  
Until the 1980s, global budgets reflecting historical expenditures were the main payment 
mechanism for public hospitals in high-income countries [62, 63] or for decentralised systems such 
as Mexico [63]. With greater concerns for efficiency of resource use, pure global budgeting has been 
abandoned in many settings and other payment mechanisms, such as sophisticated case-based 
payments, have been introduced to reimburse facilities for a significant part of their costs.  
Fee-for-service or (retrospective) cost-based reimbursement is widely used in high-income countries 
for paying for services delivered by private hospitals or private patients in public hospitals [62]. It has 
also been used in systems characterised by multiple insurers and private providers [63], such as 
Japan, some regions in Switzerland, and the US, Germany and Canada before case-based payments 
were introduced. On the other hand, there has recently been a growing interest in low-income 
countries for these types of facility payment systems to stimulate the delivery of health services. In 
such settings, they have often been termed performance-based financing, since the amount of 
money received by facilities is directly related to the services delivered (according to a schedule of 
fees agreed in advance). 
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Per-day payments have been adopted by many Eastern European countries when they moved away 
from centrally-planned systems, as their design and implementation required little data or capacity 
[61].  
Following the pioneering introduction of Diagnostic-Related Groups (DRGs) for Medicare inpatients 
in the US, most high-income countries introduced case-based payments accounting for case-mix in 
the 1990s [62]. Concerned with cost escalation and efficiency gains in hospital care, a number of 
middle-income countries have followed the same path, including Taiwan, China, Brazil, Colombia or 
Mexico [64-66].  
It is important to underline that, similar to individual provider payments, reimbursement 
mechanisms for facility-based care have evolved towards blended systems mixing different 
approaches as purchasers have tried to fine-tune the objectives of their health care policies. For 
example, most European countries have moved away from pure budgets to increase the share of 
case-based reimbursements adjusting for case-mix.  
4.3. Evidence of effects 
Six literature reviews were identified that present empirical evidence on the impact of hospital 
payment mechanisms [67-72]. However, none of them adopted a systematic review approach, and 
most provided very partial details on the included studies (see Table A4 in the Appendix). All studies 
reviewed were set in high-income countries, most of them concerning the switch that occurred in 
the United States, when fee-for-service reimbursement was replaced by a case-based prospective 
payment system for Medicare inpatients. Most included studies were before and after (non-
randomised) studies, having taken advantage of the change from one system to another.  
In addition to the reviews, we identified additional studies that used a control group when pilot 
experiments of a particular reimbursement mechanism were implemented [64, 73]. However, issues 
of selection bias (when participation in the pilot was voluntary) or small sample size may limit the 
external validity of these findings. Finally, two studies were identified that assessed the effects of a 
facility payment mechanism, one using a randomised-control trial to evaluate the impact of fee-for-
service payments for particular services on top of the traditional line-item budgets provided to 
facilities in Rwanda [74], and a quasi-experimental study comparing global budgets to fee-for-service 
payments in China [75, 76].  
To complement this literature focusing essentially on the effects of case-based payments, we report 
evidence from two additional types of studies. First, we sometimes refer to reviews of country 
experiences [77-79] that draw on descriptive studies and present some characteristics associated 
with different payment mechanisms. Second, in countries where multiple payment mechanisms 
coexist in the health care system, researchers have tried to compare their relative performance, 
although ‘control’ and ‘intervention’ facilities are not strictly comparable (they typically differ in the 
organisational and/or market structures in which they operate).  
Impact on service use 
There is mixed evidence suggesting that introducing case-based payments (adjusting for case-mix) 
leads to increases in the number of hospital admissions. Several studies from the US reported such 
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an effect [68], as did a study from Hungary [66]. However, there was also evidence from the US that 
when the FFS system was replaced by DRGs [71], the number of hospital admissions decreased 
(these findings might be due to a high level of supplier-induced demand before).  
In the Czech Republic, the switch from line-item budgets to fee-for-service payments in the early 
1990s led to large increases in the volume of care provided, to the extent that the corresponding rise 
in health care expenditures led to the bankruptcies of several insurance companies [77].  
In Rwanda, the introduction of a fee-for-service system of reimbursement for primary health care 
facilities for eight services provided (e.g. curative consultation, first pre-natal visit, delivery) was 
associated with an increase in service utilisation [74], compared to traditional line-item budgets.  
Compromising equity in access to care, there is partial evidence of cream-skimming behaviours by 
medical institutions once they start being remunerated by efficiency-inducing mechanisms such as 
global payments in China [75], Germany and France [80], as well as with case-based payments in the 
US [71]. 
Impact on efficiency  
In most eastern European countries and former communist counties before the transition, line-item 
budgets have been associated with the development of inadequate supply characteristics, as there 
was no incentive to reduce excess capacity (large buildings, large staff) or economise on inputs [31]. 
Similar anecdotal evidence from Costa Rica before hospital payment reforms were implemented 
suggests that line-item budgets did not create any incentive to economise [81]. 
Evidence from countries adopting per-diem payments confirms the incentive of the mechanism to 
increase artificially the length of stay. In Slovak Republic, anecdotal evidence suggests that moving 
from budgets to per-diem payments in 1998 led to an increase in hospital length of stay by two days, 
and encouraged hospitals to unnecessarily admit patients who were less severely-ill [77].  
There are numerous studies from the US and other countries showing that the switch from FFS to 
case-based payment adjusting for case-mix led to reductions in length of average stay in hospitals 
[69, 71, 72, 82]. Other studies have reported similar reductions in measures of resource use (such as 
number of consultations per patients [83] or antibiotic use [64]) with case-based payment systems.  
A natural experiment in Hainan province in China also showed that compared to FFS, global budgets 
were associated with a slower increase in spending on expensive drugs, high technology services 
[76] and overall expenditures [75]. 
In Norway, no difference was found between four pilot hospitals funded with a combination of case-
based payments and global budgets, and reference hospitals under pure global budgets ; there was a 
greater efficiency of resource use and a decline in length of stays in both groups [73]. In contrast, in 
Sweden, case costs in counties using prospective case-based payments were 13% lower than those 
of other counties with global budgets [84]. 
However, with case-based retrospective payments, there are concerns - somewhat confirmed by 
evidence - that efficiency gains may have been artificially created by shifting patients from inpatient 
to other hospital services or care facilities [68, 70]. 
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Finally, it should be noted that greater efficiency in resource use per case may not necessarily lead to 
cost containment at the system level, since efficiency gains can be compensated by greater volume 
of activities [68]. For example, the introduction of case-based payments in Stockholm County led to 
a sharp rise in the volume of services and therefore, on overall spending [63]. Early assessment of 
the introduction of DRGs for Medicare patients suggested that they had contributed to halting the 
growth rate of costs [72]. However, there was hardly any change in Germany [85] following the 
introduction of DRGs. In Sweden, a comparison of hospitals that had adopted case-based payments 
and hospitals that had not [86] concluded that introducing case-based payments had contributed to 
increasing the number of diagnoses. In addition, there is partial (anecdotal) evidence of gaming 
behaviours with case-based payments, with providers allocating patients to more costly groups than 
those to which they actually belong (DRG-creep) [68]. 
When they have been strictly enforced, global budgets have automatically allowed a better control 
of overall expenditures [70]. For example, researchers have attributed the slow inpatient 
expenditure growth in France to the adoption of strictly enforced fixed budgets between 1960 and 
1990 [87]. 
Impact on quality of care and health outcomes 
Considering their set objectives to increase efficiency of resource use and control (if not reduce) 
costs, there are theoretical reasons to believe that case-based payments or global budgets might 
adversely affect quality of care. Studies from high-income countries that have looked at such issues 
have used a wide array of quality measures including mortality rates, re-admission rates, 
complications and shifts from inpatient to ambulatory care for difficult procedures.  
For global budgets, there is only very limited anecdotal evidence from China suggesting that quality 
of care may have been affected adversely by the introduction of global budgets [75], as opposed to a 
FFS system.  
Regarding case-based payments, the empirical literature has produced mixed evidence supporting 
the potentially adverse effect on such quality measures following a change from FFS to case-based 
reimbursement. While early before-and-after studies showed signs that patients were released from 
hospitals “quicker and sicker” [68], later studies did not find evidence of worsening health outcomes 
[88-95]. However, other sophisticated econometric studies have argued that reductions in length of 
stay were partly associated with lower quality measured by ‘intensity of care’ [82]. More worryingly, 
there is evidence from the US suggesting that moving from FFS to case-based payment led to 
increased strategic behaviour by hospitals, which shifted some patients from inpatient services to 
outpatient visits [96] or long-term care facilities [97]. There is anecdotal evidence from Poland [77] 
that case-based payments have led to patient-dumping (resisting admission for complicated and 
costly cases) and cream-skimming through admission of easier cases.  
We found no study reporting evidence on the link between quality of care or health outcomes and 
line-item budgets or per-diem payments.  
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Table 3: Summary of evidence on effects of hospital payment mechanisms 
Mechanism Expected benefits Expected pitfalls 
Line-item budget • Simplicity ∅ 
• Cost containment ∅ 
• Under-provision of services ⊕ 
Global budgets • Greater efficiency of resource use ⊕ 
• Cost containment ⊕ 
• Under-provision of services ∅ 
• Lower quality of care ⊕ 
• Patient-dumping or risk selection ⊕ 
• Cream-skimming ⊕ 
 
Fee-for service • Increase providers’ motivation ∅ 
• Increase quantity of services provided ⊕ 
• Over-servicing ⊕ 
• Inefficiency of resource use ⊕ 
  
Per-day 
payments 
• Incentive to provide more services ⊕ • Lower efficiency of resource used ⊕ 
 
Case-based 
payments 
• Greater efficiency of resource use ⊕ 
• Cost containment ⊕ 
• Over-servicing ⊕ 
• Lower quality of care ⊕ 
• Cream-skimming (avoid high-cost patients) 
⊕ 
• Patient-shifting (discharge to other services) 
⊕ 
• Cost-shifting (compensate loss with 
increased costs elsewhere) ⊕ 
 
Note: ∅ : there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis;  
⊕ : there is limited evidence of low/moderate quality supporting the hypothesis;  
⊕⊕ : there is good quality evidence supporting the theoretical assumption. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
Modifying factors 
Broader differences in management structures, organisation of supply services and patient 
characteristics are likely to have shaped some of the effects that have been found.  
A key aspect in a change in hospital reimbursement mechanisms has been the power relationships 
between health care professionals and hospital management [98, 99]. A number of case studies 
have reported important resistance from medical staff that has challenged the implementation and 
actual effects of hospital payment reforms [81, 98, 99].  
As with individual provider payments, when payments are agreed prospectively, the level of the 
reimbursement agreed (or fee schedule) is likely to have a critical influence on the mechanism 
effects. In effect, underestimating the costs incurred by facilities to treat patients can have 
detrimental effects on service provision and quality of care, while over-estimating them will not 
increase efficiency (even with mechanisms that are supposed to create such incentives). Many 
criticisms have been made regarding the calculation of case-based payments [71], including the 
inadequacy of average costs defined in DRGs to adjust for inflation and technology improvements, 
and the difficulty of estimating adequately all the variables that enter into the hospital cost function.  
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Local applicability 
The capacity and information system required for a good implementation vary a lot from one 
hospital payment mechanism to another. This point leads to the necessity of evaluating the 
desirability (and feasibility) of implementing some payment mechanisms in contexts where 
information systems might not be sophisticated enough to define adequate cost benchmarks. As 
underlined before, many problems have emerged with case-based payment methods adjusting for 
case-mix. In addition to their operational complexity, these mechanisms depend on the availability 
of relatively consistent and comprehensive activity and cost data [77]. Most Eastern European 
countries have had to update thoroughly their information systems to allow the transition from line-
item budgets to DRG-type payment systems. In contrast, per diem or budgets have often been used 
because they required little data or capacity to design and implement [61].  
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5. Paying for Performance 
In this section, pay for performance (P4P) schemes refer to payment methods that give financial 
incentives to health care providers for improved performance on measures of quality and efficiency 
[100, 101]. There has been a recent tendency to expand the definition of P4P from its origins in the 
US, particularly in the context of schemes in developing countries, to include output-based 
payments, contracting out and even fee-for-service payments, as discussed above [102]. Because 
there is no accepted definition of P4P, there is considerable scope for confusion and this is evident in 
the literature [103]. This is, for example, the case with contracting out, which we regard as a broader 
health financing approach that may or may not involve the use of performance-based payments in 
the purchasing of health care services. Thus, we adopt the restrictive definition of P4P given above 
and maintain an emphasis on the payment mechanism. 
 
5.1. P4P mechanisms and related incentives 
The idea behind P4P is that it aligns the incentives of various parties (patients, health providers, 
purchasers) involved in the provision of health care. By measuring performance, information 
problems among the various parties are reduced and incentives can be aligned [104, 105]. Based on 
the experience of P4P, it is possible to lay out the main dimensions along which the design of 
schemes can vary. These design features bring to attention a number of conceptual issues relevant 
to how P4P incentives work and their potential pitfalls [106]. Four main elements are likely to be 
important.  
First, P4P schemes are characterised by the measure of performance they use. Almost without 
exception, schemes use performance measures related to quality of care and/or efficiency. Financial 
incentives are expected to improve the measures of performance used as the basis for reward. 
However, the measures of performance not targeted by financial incentives could deteriorate, as 
resources and attention are shifted towards service areas and conditions that are rewarded [107]. 
Health providers may even go so far as to give preference to patients for whom they are more likely 
to perform well and neglect those who may respond less well to treatment or be less compliant [56], 
a behaviour commonly referred to as cream-skimming. Incentives are also unlikely to improve 
clinical performance if the measure is influenced by factors outside of the health provider’s control 
and poorly reflects clinical effectiveness. 
Second, P4P schemes are characterised by the way they set the payment condition. Individuals are 
more likely to respond to incentives if they are rewarded for each activity undertaken [108]. Health 
providers can be paid on the basis of:  
- Each clinical activity or action undertaken as part of the process of care.  
- Reaching a target threshold or a continuum of thresholds that pay increasing amounts of 
money the higher the rate obtained. With a single threshold, there is no incentive for 
improvements that fall short or go beyond the threshold [109]. That is, poor performers and 
exceptional performers may not be incentivised. 
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- Their own performance relative to other health providers. The intention is to generate 
healthy competition among providers, but it can introduce uncertainty (payment depends 
on the performance of others not just on his or her performance) and may sustain gaps in 
the quality of care between high and low performers [106].  
- Their own relative performance over time.  
Third, P4P schemes vary in how they define key attributes of the payment. Possible options include: 
- The frequency of payment. Theory suggests that more frequent but smaller payments may have 
a larger effect on behaviour because each payment is considered as a new gain and therefore 
psychologically more motivating [110]. 
- The size of the payment. The reward should compensate the recipient of payments for the 
incremental net cost of his/her action [108]. In this respect, greater rewards can be expected to 
lead to larger effects.  
- The lag time between the provision of care and payment. Shorter lag time might be preferable 
as the value attached to money received immediately can be perceived as much greater than 
the equivalent amount received even in the near future [111, 112]. 
- Whether to offer bonus payments for good performance and/or withheld payments for 
underperformance. Loss aversion theory suggests that withholding money tends to induce a 
greater behavioural response than the promise of providing money [113] . There may, however, 
be negative psychological consequences linked to notions of fairness [114]. 
Fourth, P4P schemes differ according to whether they reward the health institution or pay individual 
health workers. Theory suggests that team incentives are weaker because individuals free-ride on 
the efforts of others, reducing the effort of everyone [115]. However, groups of health workers may 
play an important risk-sharing function, which may be lost if individuals are incentivised [116]. 
 
5.2. Experiences to date 
There has been experience with P4P in the US, the UK and, to a lesser extent, other OECD countries. 
In the US, for example, as many as half of all commercial health maintenance organisations use 
performance based payments in their contracts with health providers [117, 118]. Although they 
remain rare, P4P schemes are being increasingly promoted in developing countries, with several 
large pilot schemes under way or in preparation [119]. Table A5 in the Appendix describes some of 
the more well-known schemes operating in various countries. 
Experience suggests that there has been enormous variation in how P4P schemes operate, although 
documentation of P4P schemes in the literature is not always very precise. The performance 
measures specified in the design of a P4P scheme reflect the priority of policymakers in the country. 
In developed countries, the vast majority of schemes seek to improve quality of care, but 
consideration is also given to efficiency in light of concerns over cost escalation. In the US, for 
example, 91% of schemes target quality of care measures and 50% target cost efficiency [120]. In 
developing countries, where under-provision of priority health services along with quality of care are 
the main challenges, some schemes have used a payment system that rewards health providers for 
increases in both utilisation and quality of care by using a combination of fee-for-service and 
performance incentives. The performance measures also reflect differences in the burden of disease 
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across countries. For example, the Quality and Outcomes Framework in the UK focuses on a set of 
chronic diseases, such as heart disease and diabetes [121]. Meanwhile, the P4P schemes in Rwanda 
and Burundi are primarily concerned with maternal and child health services [74, 122].  
Quality of care measures are commonly categorised according to the structure-process-outcome 
paradigm [123]. Many P4P schemes use structural measures of quality, particularly those in low-
income countries, because they are easy to measure. The P4P schemes in Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Cambodia place a heavy emphasis on measures such as the availability of inputs and cleanliness. 
Process measures are generally considered the most direct measure of quality and are commonly 
used in P4P schemes in high-income countries where sophisticated monitoring systems are 
available. The P4P scheme in Rwanda also uses a number of process measures whereby health 
workers are directly observed and their performance compared against the benchmark of the 
national clinical guidelines. Outcome measures related to mortality and morbidity are rarely used in 
P4P schemes, as they are difficult to measure (patient survival can require many years to measure) 
and it is not easy to attribute any change to the health provider (many factors influence outcomes). 
Intermediate outcomes, such as blood pressure and cholesterol level [124], are commonly used in 
developed countries, as are measures of patient satisfaction, to reflect interpersonal aspects of care.  
Most P4P schemes appear to have been targeted at health facilities. In the US, for example, 61% of 
schemes target groups and 25% target both individual doctors and groups [118]. This is largely 
because monitoring individual incentives requires an intense and potentially overly burdensome 
information system. The monitoring burden explains why the scheme in Cambodia shifted from 
individual payments to health facility payments [125].  
5.3. Evidence of effects 
The presentation of empirical findings draws upon eight systematic reviews of P4P incentives [56, 
117, 126-131] presented briefly in Table A6 in the Appendix. The vast majority of studies included in 
these articles were conducted in the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK. There was also considerable 
overlap in terms of the studies included in the reviews. In one of the most recent systematic reviews, 
of the 36 articles that met the inclusion criteria, at least 32 were done in the US (23) or the UK (9) 
[132]. A particular focus of the studies in the UK is the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a 
nationwide P4P scheme that was introduced for family practices in 2005. Similarly, a number of 
studies in the US focus on just one scheme, the Premier Ltd Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration (HQID), which started in 2003 and has attracted the most attention of all P4P 
schemes in the US. For this reason, particular attention is given to these two P4P schemes in the 
presentation of findings.  
Searches identified a small number of additional studies, including three recent studies on the QOF 
in the UK [124, 133, 134] and one study on the HQID in the US [135] that were not covered by the 
systematic reviews, two studies in Rwanda, [136, 137], two studies in Taiwan [138, 139], and one 
study of limited quality in Cambodia [125]. It is clear from this summary that the literature on P4P in 
developing countries is limited. However, an evaluation of the scheme in Rwanda represents the 
most robust, large-scale evaluation of P4P to-date [136].  
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Impact on quality of care  
Evidence on the effectiveness of P4P mechanisms targeting quality improvements is mixed, 
according to four of the systematic reviews [117, 126, 130, 132]. Few significant impacts have been 
reported and where they are found, they tend to be small in magnitude. Two of the reviews find 
even less evidence for optimism, concluding that the empirical foundations for improving quality of 
care with performance incentives are weak [127, 128]. One review focused specifically on 
performance incentives in hospitals and found evidence of a positive effect on quality of care only in 
the case of the HQID in the US [127]. Finally, one review examined the impact of P4P on inequalities 
in health care and almost all studies identified concern for the QOF in the UK. The review found 
weak evidence of a reduction in inequalities in chronic disease management among socioeconomic 
groups due to P4P, but no evidence in relation to age, sex and ethnicity. Almost all authors noted the 
lack of research on P4P in health and substantial methodological weaknesses with existing studies.  
Findings suggest the QOF in the UK improved the quality of care for asthma and diabetes, but had no 
effect on quality of care for heart disease or interpersonal aspects of care [133]. The scheme 
reduced disparities in the quality of clinical care across family practices [124]. Practices in the most 
deprived areas of the country improved the quality of care to a much greater extent than those in 
less deprived areas, thereby reducing inequalities.  
With regards to the HQID in the US, two studies find that programme had a significant but small 
impact on quality of care [140, 141]. After adjusting for hospital characteristics and baseline 
performance, the P4P scheme is found to improve quality of care by 2.6 percent to 4.1 percent over 
two years [141]. The lowest performing hospitals at baseline increased their quality score by 16 
percentage points, while the highest performing increased quality by only 1.9 points, suggesting 
convergence in hospital performance.  
The results of an evaluation of a P4P scheme in Rwanda indicate that performance incentives had a 
significant positive effect on the quality of prenatal care and the chances of women being given a 
tetanus vaccination during prenatal care [136]. It should be noted that resources were kept constant 
across the control and treatment groups such that impact estimates isolate the incentive effect.  
A national P4P programme in Taiwan focusing solely on tuberculosis was found to improve the cure 
rate, reduce the average length of treatment and reduce the treatment default rate. The results, 
however, come from an analysis of the situation before and after implementation of P4P (without a 
control) and are thus likely to be confounded by other factors outside the programme.  
The literature provides some evidence on unintended, typically undesirable, effects of P4P. A 
systematic review found that four out of 17 studies reported evidence on unintended effects [117]. 
Three studies observed improvements in documentation, but no improvement in actual clinical 
quality of care given to patients. One study found strong incentives to game the system in other 
ways, for example, by claiming to admit extremely disabled patients who recovered unusually 
quickly. There was also evidence of cream-skimming. Performance incentives appear to have 
motivated health providers to avoid severely ill patients.  
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The QOF in the UK reduced quality of care for some conditions which were not incentivised [133]. 
The performance incentives worsened continuity of care, an aspect of care that is valued by 
patients. Qualitative evidence suggests that performance incentives worsened patient interaction 
because physicians were faced with dozens of clinical targets and a requirement to enter data into a 
computer [134]. In Rwanda, qualitative findings from interviews with health workers about the 
scheme highlight concerns about the additional workload, which meant that potentially life-saving 
activities in the intensive care unit were neglected [137]. Various types of gaming were also 
reported, including the avoidance of drug stock-outs by not distributing remaining drugs and 
distortion of information for monitoring.  
Impact on service use 
Evidence of the impact of P4P schemes on the provision of services is mixed. A systematic review of 
performance incentives for delivering preventive health services found that only one of the eight 
financial incentives reviewed led to a significant increase in the provision of services. The lack of 
effect was attributed to the small size of the bonus payments [129]. The QOF in the UK was found to 
have no impact on patients’ reports on access to care [133]. 
In developing countries, evidence shows positive effects. In Rwanda, results indicate that 
performance incentives had a significant positive effect on institutional delivery care and child health 
visits, but no impact on prenatal care visits or immunisation rates [136]. Variation in the effect 
across these different services is attributed in part to the size of the rewards. However, it should be 
noted that these effects can be attributed to the overall scheme, which technically consists of a fee-
for-service component and a quality indicator judging the performance of providers (see section 
4.3). In Cambodia, substantial increases in utilisation of maternal and child health services were 
reported before and after the start of the intervention [125], but critiques have underlined that, 
aside from the weak study design, many other interventions implemented in parallel may have 
contributed to these effects and confounding is likely to have severely biased results [103]. 
Impact on health outcomes 
There is almost no evidence on the effect of P4P schemes on health outcomes. Despite findings 
suggesting improvements in quality processes, there is evidence that the HQID in the US had no 
effect on mortality [135, 142]. It is not clear why the improvements in quality of care have not 
translated into better health outcomes, but it is worth noting that the bonus payments were 
relatively small. Evidence on health outcomes from the evaluation in Rwanda has yet to be reported. 
Impact on efficiency  
Only two studies reported effects on the cost of care. In the US, the HQID was found to have no 
effect on the cost of Medicare [135]. A study included in one of systematic reviews [117] found that 
there were cost savings as a results of the performance incentives [143].  
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Table 4: Summary of evidence on P4P mechanisms 
Dimension Expected benefits Expected pitfalls  
Performance 
measures 
• Incentives improve the performance 
indicator ⊕ 
 
• Incentives will not improve and potentially worsen 
performance on those measures for which there is 
no reward ⊕ 
• Incentives will improve performance only insofar as 
the measure is valid ∅ 
• Incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation ∅ 
 
Basis for 
payment 
 • A target threshold means no incentive for 
improvements that fall short of or go beyond the 
threshold ⊕ 
 
Payment 
attributes 
• The larger the size of payment, the 
more effective the scheme ⊕ 
• Small frequent payments induce 
greater behavioural response than 
one large payment ∅ 
• Shorter the lag time between the 
rewarded action and receipt of 
incentive, the greater the behavioural 
response ∅ 
• Withheld payments have a larger 
effect than bonuses ∅ 
 
• Withheld payments may have negative 
psychological effects ∅ 
 
Recipient of 
payment 
 • Group incentives to perform are weaker than 
individual incentives ⊕ 
Note: ∅ : there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis;  
⊕ : there is limited evidence of low/moderate quality supporting the hypothesis;  
⊕⊕ : there is good quality evidence supporting the theoretical assumption. 
 
5.4. Discussion 
Modifying factors  
Existing coverage of an intervention or compliance with a particular quality of care measure is likely 
to be an important determinant of impact. If coverage is low, there is more scope for a change in 
behaviour. If all women, for example, are screened for breast cancer, there is no point in providing 
incentives for health providers to undertake this clinical activity. It is also reasonable to assume that 
incentives will only affect health outcomes if they are targeted towards interventions for which 
there is strong evidence of effectiveness. 
P4P schemes are complex and their effects are likely to depend on features of the design, which can 
vary a lot (see section 5.1). Although the body of research on P4P is currently too limited to provide 
strong insights about how P4P schemes should be designed to maximise their impact on quality of 
care [106, 132, 144], some tentative evidence already does exist that suggests that design 
characteristics matter. For example, in the UK, it appears that once targets were reached, 
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improvements in the quality of care slowed, suggesting a ceiling effect associated with having a 
maximum threshold target above which no bonus payments are paid [133]. In other studies in the 
US, the small size and infrequent payment of the bonus were both regarded as strong contenders for 
why performance payments had no effect or a small effect [117].  Finally, certain designs may be 
more appropriate for mitigating the potential for unintended behaviours and negative effects. 
However, the balance between using the carrot of bonus payments and stick of penalties is far from 
straightforward [145]. 
 Local applicability 
Aside from the issue of impact, there are important questions around implementation challenges 
and capacity required to set up these schemes. The idea of paying incentives on the basis of quality 
of care is technically demanding, typically requiring highly sophisticated information technology and 
monitoring systems. Thus, transferring the concept to health systems with far less capacity than, say, 
the NHS in UK is likely to require major modifications in the design of schemes. In practice, the 
selection of performance measures to be monitored and used as the basis for payment must be 
pragmatic. Measures used, at least in the first instance, are likely to be ones that are already widely 
available or easy to collect data [106]. But there is no guarantee such measures correspond to 
appropriate measures of clinical performance. In this regard, it worth reiterating that the HQID 
programme in the US was shown to improve the process of care but not health outcomes [135, 141].  
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6.  Conditional Cash Transfers 
6.1. CCTs and related incentives 
Conditional cash transfers consist in making a transfer of money to individuals contingent upon their 
completion of certain requirements.  
CCTs aim to address two types of obstacles to the uptake of essential health care interventions such 
as immunisations, antenatal care visits or even assisted deliveries. The first one consists of the 
financial costs individuals must bear when they decide to use health services. They include the 
potential direct cost of using health services (when they are not completely free), the indirect cost 
(in particular, the cost of transport can create major obstacles), and the opportunity cost (for 
example, the loss of revenue incurred by the use of health services instead of spending that time on 
income-generating activities). Secondly, CCTs also address more entrenched demand-side obstacles, 
such as cultural barriers or the failure to perceive the benefits of preventive health interventions. 
6.2. Experiences to date  
Although they are now spreading to lower-income settings, the majority of CCT programmes have 
been implemented in middle-income countries. With their success and spread beyond Latin 
America, CCTs have gradually been seen in the health sector as innovative tools that would help 
address a series of demand-side barriers limiting the use of preventive and/or basic curative health 
services. Recent programmes with health components have been launched in Turkey [146], Kenya 
[147], Malawi [148], Indonesia [149], the Philippines [150] and two similar CCTs for maternal health 
services have been implemented in Nepal [151] and India [152].  
Historically, the first CCT programmes were designed and introduced to act as social transfer 
mechanisms, aiming to provide a safety net to its recipients, and health conditions were only one 
dimension of several requirements (see Table A8 in the Appendix). A more limited number of CCT 
programmes have since focused only on improving the uptake of particular preventive health 
interventions. One CCT programme in Malawi offered financial incentives to increase the uptake of 
testing for HIV status [148] and two programmes in Nepal [151] and India [152] linked cash transfers 
to delivering in health facilities. 
Another source of variation across programmes has been the extent to which CCTs were 
implemented in conjunction with interventions strengthening the delivery of health services. Whilst 
early CCT programmes implemented in Latin American countries consisted of demand-side 
interventions only, later programmes have sometimes taken specific steps to improve the existing 
health care delivery system. For example, in Nicaragua, private providers were contracted to ensure 
an adequate response of supply to an expected increase in the use of services [153], while in India 
and Nepal, salary incentives were introduced for staff. 
Most CCT schemes have sought to target the poor and more vulnerable groups of the population. 
However, the modalities of targeting have varied across programmes, going from simple geographic 
targeting of regions or local communities to the use of complex information systems or proxy 
means-testing to identify the poorest households.  
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Finally, CCT programmes have varied a lot with respect to the size of incentives used, going from 
USD1 [148] to USD 50 [154], although these differences also relate to different conditionalities. 
6.3. Evidence of effects 
This section reviews the evidence on the effects of CCTs on the uptake of health services. It relies on 
the findings and evidence summarised in four recent reviews of the effects of CCTs on service 
utilisation [8, 155-157], including one Cochrane systematic review [157], described in Table A9 in the 
Appendix. In addition, a few descriptive studies and two recent impact evaluations using 
econometric  techniques to assess the programme effects were included in this overview [151, 158].  
Many CCT programmes have been designed and implemented following a quasi-experimental or 
experimental design, or have first introduced a pilot programme, allowing rigorous evaluations of 
their impact [157]. Consequently, there is a broad and reasonably robust body of evidence on the 
effects of CCTs.  
CCTs have been found to improve significantly the uptake of preventive services in the vast majority 
of programmes. A small scale project in Malawi [148] found that monetary incentives increased the 
percentage of individuals collecting HIV test results, and that the effect was increasing with the 
amount of the cash transfer. In Mexico, families benefiting from Progresa visited health facilities 
twice as frequently as non-beneficiary families [159]. In Honduras, the PRAF programme significantly 
increased health service utilization for pre-school children [160], the uptake of routine child check-
ups and growth monitoring visits, and the use of antenatal care, even if no effect was found on the 
uptake of post-delivery check-ups. In Nicaragua, the Red de Protección Social scheme improved the 
proportion of disadvantaged infants (0-3 years old) taken to health centres in the past 6 months, 
both one and two years after it had started [153]. In Colombia, CCTs were found to increase the 
uptake of preventive health care visits for children aged less than 4 years old [154, 161] . The PATH 
programme in Jamaica was recently found to be effective at increasing the use of preventive health 
care for children in recipient families [162]. Lastly, the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme in Nepal 
was found to be effective in increasing use of skilled attendance at delivery and reducing the 
probability of a woman delivering at home [151]. Only two programmes from Chile and Ecuador 
were found ineffective at increasing the regular preventive visits of children [8].  
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes have sometimes proven to be an effective intervention to 
increase immunization rates amongst children, although they have also failed to do so in several 
cases (see Table A10 in the Appendix). Positive effects were found in Mexico on Measles and TB 
vaccination rates [163], in Honduras on the coverage of the first dose DTP/pentavalent vaccine [160] 
and in Colombia on the probability that children aged 24 months old had complied with the DPT 
vaccination schedule [164]. In Mexico, there was no evidence that Progresa had an effect on 
immunisation rates in the long-run, which might suggest that CCTs are less effective in further 
improving rates where these have reached a high level [157]. These three programmes have failed to 
have a significant impact on the vaccination levels of particular age groups, although the reasons 
behind these differences in findings are unclear. Finally, two programmes found no impact on the 
uptake of immunisation. In Nicaragua, no difference was found between control and intervention 
groups that both benefited from high increases in immunisation rates, which may have been caused 
by contamination problems in the control groups [153]. In Paraguay, there was no difference in the 
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proportion of children with updated vaccinations between control and intervention groups 
benefiting from Tekoporã, [158].  
6.4. Discussion 
Despite the successes obtained by CCTs in several settings, a series of issues needs to be kept in 
mind in considering the replicability of CCT programmes to other settings. 
Modifying factors 
As demonstrated by one study where payments varied from $1 to $3 [148], the size of the transfer is 
likely to have an impact of the effects of CCTs. It is likely that if transfers are too low and do not 
cover indirect and opportunity costs associated with health-seeking behaviours, the effects of CCTs 
might be limited. On the other hand, the existence of possible threshold effects of incentives levels 
may lead to inefficiency if cash transfers are unnecessarily high and could have induced the same 
effects with smaller transfers.  
Recent reports from the Nepali and Jamaican schemes [151, 162] show that the lack of 
communication around the scheme, failure to provide clear guidelines to health workers, and erratic 
funding resulting in payment delays, can jeopardise the success of CCTs.  
Finally, the targeting characteristics of CCTs might affect their equity impact. In particular, if CCTs 
don’t target the poorest, they might disproportionally benefit wealthier groups. Indeed, since 
utilisation of health services is typically already higher amongst the better-off, CCTs are likely to 
benefit disproportionally the richer groups [151]. This raises the issue of the benefit incidence of 
such non-targeted incentive schemes where a disproportionate share of the budget might be spent 
on wealthier groups, and the marginal cost per additional poor user might be extremely high.  
Local applicability 
CCTs have proven to be complex interventions that require substantial human and technical 
capacity, and political support [165]. They have sometimes relied almost exclusively on external 
funding [156]. Using CCTs to achieve universal coverage of interventions might not necessarily be an 
easy or a sustainable option for countries that have limited capacity or resources. 
Early and successful CCT experiences have been implemented in middle-income countries where 
they have benefited from the existence of adequate basic infrastructure (banks, roads and health 
facility networks). However, the lack of such infrastructure is likely to mitigate the success of CCT 
programmes. In particular, since these programmes try to bridge important gaps in social 
provisioning for poor households, they are not designed to address problems related to a lack of 
geographical access to health services (an issue particularly common to sub-Saharan African 
countries). CCTs can only work where facilities already exist and if they are able to respond to the 
increase in demand that these programmes might generate. 
Most of the successful CCT programmes implemented in Latin American countries have relied on a 
capability to target the neediest populations. They were able to identify the poorest populations 
because of up-to-date information systems that provided data on income and population 
characteristics. In low-income settings, similar detailed databases are usually not available. Under 
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such circumstances, establishing clear methods and criteria to identify beneficiary groups can be 
particularly challenging (and subject to varying interpretations), as demonstrated by the pitfalls of 
experiences of exemption schemes for the poor [166]. 
7. Discussion  
7.1. Summary of findings  
This section summarises the evidence of effects found for each type of payment mechanisms, and 
describes the main research and methodological gaps in this body of research.  
 Evidence of effects 
Despite the lack of detailed empirical evidence, it is clear that the choice of reimbursement 
mechanisms, using salary, FFS or capitation, will influence the clinical behaviour of individual health 
care providers. The available results are mixed, but FFS remuneration does appear to result in higher 
rates of consultation and increased use of resources when compared with capitation or salaried 
payment. The differences between reimbursement by capitation or salary have been relatively 
trivial. The available studies have not shown significantly different health outcomes among the three 
reimbursement mechanisms. There is no available evidence on the impact of provider 
reimbursement mechanisms on provider satisfaction, efficiency or patient selection. 
Despite the dearth and imperfect nature of evidence on hospital payment mechanisms, a few 
lessons have emerged from experiences and theory. Line-items budgets essentially offer a simple 
and straightforward way to control allocation of resources, but they are likely to lead to a waste of 
resources, and may promote under-provision of care. Global budgets are useful tools to contain 
costs while allowing some flexibility to facilities, but they may not encourage efficiency of resource 
use either. Fee-for-service and per-diems will encourage providers to increase the volume of 
inpatient care provided, to the detriment of efficiency of resource use. This can lead to unnecessary 
hospital admissions and, specifically for per-day payments, longer lengths of stay. Case-based 
payments improve efficiency of resources but their impact on quality, volume of care provided and 
overall costs is uncertain.  
While it seems intuitive that paying money for better quality of care improves health, the empirical 
basis in support of P4P is currently far from strong. There are instances of large-scale P4P schemes 
showing positive effects. But these encouraging findings should be balanced against studies that 
show performance incentives have failed to work. Where positive results have been found, the 
magnitude of the impact estimates suggests P4P is no magic bullet. At best, it is likely to be just one 
of an armoury of interventions that can contribute towards the goal of universal coverage. The 
findings of this paper have a number of implications for both policy and research. These are 
summarised below.  
Relying on impact evaluations of an overall good quality, conditional cash transfer programmes have 
demonstrated a series of positive effects on the uptake of health care interventions. Yet key 
questions remain with regard to their cost-effectiveness and their replicability to poor settings.  
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 Methodological and research gaps 
The vast majority of empirical studies on provider payment mechanisms comes from high-income 
countries. Therefore, not only can one challenge the external validity of conclusions from these 
settings to more resource-constrained ones, but the focus of this literature reflects the main debates 
in high-income countries, which are not necessarily relevant for low- and middle-income countries 
seeking to achieve universal coverage. For example, there are many studies that have investigated 
the effects of case-based payments in hospitals or the effects of pay-for-performance schemes; 
however, in many countries such systems might be undesirable due to their complexity (in particular 
for small facilities), and policy-makers might be more interested in understanding how to improve 
more traditional budget systems. Similarly, most of the empirical research on individual provider 
payments has focused on doctors, while in many health systems other health cadres (nurses or 
clinical officers) might play a critical role in providing primary care services. Finally, whilst this 
mechanism is increasingly mentioned as a possible policy option to improve staff performance in 
low- and middle-income countries, the jury is still out on the potential effects and the possibility to 
implement P4P mechanisms in such settings. Besides, there might be some confusion in the 
terminology employed as to whether one refers to P4P schemes or fee-for-service initiatives which 
link remuneration to the services provided.  
Regarding conditional cash transfers, the main gap in the literature concerns the capacity of these 
schemes to provide policy-makers with a cost-effective intervention. Indeed, two characteristics of 
these programmes raise doubts concerning their capacity to disburse money efficiently. Firstly, 
Caldes and Maluccio [167] have showed that a large proportion of the costs of CCT programmes 
comes from steps taken to target poor people effectively and monitor that the conditionalities are 
satisfied. For example, in the Colombian CCT programme, administrative costs represented half of 
the value of actual benefits delivered to beneficiaries [168]. Secondly, the cost per additional user 
can be particularly high (in particular when initial uptake rates are high), since payments will be 
made to all of those who were already complying with the conditionalities on their own accord [156, 
169].  
Concerning pay-for-performance mechanisms, because they are recently developed methods for 
paying providers, there are still several questions that remain pending, even in high-income 
countries. First, it is unclear to what extent P4P can have a negative impact on providers’ motivation. 
While P4P assume that health providers are motivated primarily by financial gain, theories of 
motivation tell us that this is not always the case [170], and that intrinsic motivation can be crowded 
out by performance payment mechanisms. More generally, there remains ample scope for further 
understanding as to whether or not performance incentives work, how they work, and what features 
are most important in determining their effectiveness.  
In terms of type of studies used, there are three obvious methodological gaps in the literature 
reviewed. 
First, there is a scarcity of rigorous evidence on the effects of payment mechanisms, with very few 
randomised controlled trials, or even controlled before-and-after studies. This is likely driven by the 
significant methodological difficulties involved in research on provider reimbursement mechanisms. 
Randomised controlled trials are often not feasible in this area because providers are not willing to 
be randomised to different payment groups that directly affect their financial livelihood. 
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Second, there are no cost-effectiveness studies comparing different alternative mechanisms. This 
gap is probably explained by two facts: first, because the decision to introduce one provider 
payment mechanism rather than another is primarily driven by political (sometimes ideological) 
reasons. Second, as we have shown, these mechanisms have different advantages and drawbacks, 
and to some extent, they can be seen as serving slightly different purposes. For example, the 
decision to move away from FFS and introduce capitation payments or case-based payments for 
hospital payment, was taken primarily to achieve efficiency gains and contain costs.  On the other 
hand, in certain settings, the decision to introduce FFS can be made to increase the use of health 
services. Nonetheless, there are a number of alternative ways to pay individual providers or health 
facilities, and each one has potentially different outcomes on quality, efficiency and service use. 
Since there might be some trade-offs involved in some of them, for example between efficiency and 
quality gains, it would be important to better understand the economic consequences of different 
options.  
Finally, there is a lack of studies describing how best to implement financing reforms and the 
conditions which support the change from one system to another. Attention should be given to the 
critical contextual requirements, the power relationships between hospital managers and clinical 
staff [98], and strategies and processes supporting successful implementation [57]. 
7.2. Implications for policy 
To advance towards universal coverage, decision-makers have to determine ways to incentivise 
providers and patients alike to increase access to good quality health services and promote efficient 
modes of delivery that can be sustainable. This background paper sought to present the various 
payment mechanisms that can be used by health authorities to reach such objectives. A variety of 
mechanisms usually co-exist in each health system, and policy-makers should view the different 
options presented here as complementary tools rather than mutually exclusive choices.  
Despite the dearth of empirical evidence, it is safe to say that the choice of reimbursement 
mechanisms for individuals or facilities is determinant in influencing the behaviour of health care 
providers. However, there is no single ideal remuneration system as each creates different positive 
and negative incentives.  
FFS remuneration (for individuals or hospitals) and per diem have been used to promote greater 
productivity by providers, and therefore increase the volume of services provided by generating 
increased revenues to providers. They can be used to motivate health care providers and increase 
the delivery of certain interventions or services, or to increase the provision of services in certain 
under-served areas. 
However, these mechanisms are unlikely to provide sustainable purchasing solutions. Having used 
these mechanisms at the beginning of their transition, a number of countries in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union have now shifted policy objectives – initial concerns with revenue 
enhancement and increased access have given way to goals related to cost containment and 
efficiency [77]. With this shift, hospital case-mix adjusted global budgeting and capitation for 
primary care providers have often been considered good options. 
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Because questions have emerged concerning the effects of these efficiency-enhancing mechanisms 
on quality of care, pay-for-performance mechanisms have emerged as a tool to improve quality of 
care and efficiency of health providers. Given how little is still known on their effects, clearly 
policymakers should proceed with caution. In contrast to many other types of interventions, P4P has 
considerable potential to do harm (particularly if the scheme is poorly designed). It is particularly 
susceptible to gaming and so mechanisms should be in place to detect such behaviours. Finally, if 
the reason for low coverage of care relates to weak demand for health services, or inadequate 
supply infrastructure, P4P is certainly not the most appropriate policy response.  
Due to the positive results of some Conditional Cash Transfer programmes, as well as the high-
profile coverage and international donor support they have received, countries wishing to progress 
towards universal coverage of essential interventions might be tempted to use them. However, the 
number of pending issues highlighted in this overview underlines the need for careful thought 
before rushing to implementation.  
If supply factors are amongst the primary problems, the demand for services induced by CCTs will 
not be satisfied and the uptake of the intervention will remain low [156]. Therefore Conditional Cash 
transfers should only appear on the list of policy options if clear demand constraints are identified, 
in particular lack of information or budget constraints. Even then, policy-makers should carefully 
weigh their decisions, since the cost-effectiveness of CCTs has so far not yet been measured against 
other approaches to improve the uptake of health services. 
In any case, P4P and conditional cash transfers should be targeted towards interventions for which 
there is strong evidence of cost effectiveness. Existing coverage of an intervention or compliance 
with a particular quality of care measure should also be considered. If coverage is low, there is more 
scope for a change in behaviour and the mechanism is bound to be more efficient.  
Ultimately, a mixture of reimbursement mechanisms and incentives is required to mitigate the 
unintended consequences of single mechanisms. This requires careful design, tailored to the local 
health system and market realities, as well as active monitoring and management. A balance must 
be struck between feasibility, acceptability and potential effects of any mechanism. Since P4P and 
payment mechanisms affect directly the remuneration of health providers, their development is 
likely to be a delicate politicised process involving negotiation among interested parties.  
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7.3. Implications for research 
Following this overview of the current state of evidence, we have identified a number of research 
priorities to be taken up by researchers and policy-makers alike.  
 Priority research questions 
The table below summarises what we consider as being the two most important research questions 
for each of the four types of mechanisms identified.  
Table 5: summary of priority research questions 
Type of mechanism Research questions 
Individual provider payment 
mechanisms 
• Are capitation systems superior to existing salaried employment 
contracts in the public sector? 
• Is there a trade-off between the efficiency gains generated by some 
remuneration systems and quality of care?  
 
Health facility payment 
mechanisms 
• What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of using budgets 
vs. case-based payments in resource- and capacity-constrained settings 
(in particular. is there a trade-off between efficiency gains and 
transaction costs generated by implementation challenges)? 
• What is the impact of the various facility payment mechanisms on 
quality of care? 
 
Pay-for-Performance 
mechanisms  
• What is the impact of P4P on patients’ outcomes and what is the cost 
of these schemes? 
• What is the impact of P4P on health workers’ intrinsic and long-term 
motivation? 
 
Conditional cash transfers • What is the cost-effectiveness of CCTs compared to other health 
systems interventions (e.g. strengthening of the supply-side, outreach 
activities, etc.)? 
• What is the relative impact of the transfer (and its size) vs. the 
conditionality? 
 
 
Regarding remuneration of individual providers, there is very little research comparing payment by 
salary with capitation payment, so for public sector employees working in a national health system. 
There is currently no indication that capitation systems would be superior to existing salaried 
employment. In addition, the existing data does indicate that salaried or capitation payment is 
associated with fewer clinical activities, which it can be assumed will result in lower costs. However, 
lower levels of service provision could compromise quality of care and health outputs, which may 
make the overall system less efficient. None of the existing studies has quantified the impact of this 
trade-off [56].  
There is hardly any experimental or quasi-experimental evidence on the relative effects of hospital 
mechanisms, and none whatsoever from low-income countries. Before moving from line-item or 
global budgets that are currently dominating the funding of primary care facilities in many 
developing countries, policy-makers would be well-advised to test the relative advantages and 
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drawbacks of potential alternatives. In addition, there is a lack of systematic research on the effects 
of facility payment mechanisms on the quality of care and health outcomes. Indeed, most of the 
available body of evidence relies on before-and-after studies without counterfactual data, which 
cannot help in understanding whether changes in health or quality outcomes were caused by the 
shift from one mechanism to the other.  
There is currently insufficient evidence on whether P4P schemes will result in improved patient 
outcomes or, equally importantly, to what extent the cost of implementing them is warranted [145]. 
Besides, it is far from clear the extent to which P4P payments can have negative effects on providers’ 
performance. A commonly cited concern is that financial incentives in health can have an adverse 
affect by crowding out intrinsic psychological incentives related to an individual’s inner motivations 
and sense of professionalism [171-173]. 
Finally, regarding Conditional Cash transfers, the most urgent question to be answered is whether 
they constitute a cost-effective option to improve the uptake of health services compared to other 
approaches (supply-side strengthening, unconditional cash transfers, etc.). This is a particularly 
critical question for countries that have limited resources and might want to use CCTs to improve 
access to health services. In addition, due to the potential logistical and administrative complexity 
involved in monitoring compliance with conditionalities, it would be important to understand better 
the benefits of such mechanisms compared to unconditional transfers or transfers with “softer” 
conditionalities (i.e. where compliance is less or not monitored). 
Methodological research priorities 
The scarcity of rigorous evidence on reimbursement mechanisms and P4P schemes in developing 
countries indicates that this should be a priority area for health systems researchers. Rigorous 
research should of course give consideration to randomised experiments. But these will rarely be 
feasible and much can be learnt from well conducted natural experiments and other non-
experimental designs. An immediate priority would be to ensure that any new policy interventions in 
this area be subjected to rigorous monitoring and evaluation. One of the avenues for further 
research, therefore, lies in a greater commitment of policy-makers who wish to introduce new 
payment mechanisms or innovative interventions to carry out well-designed pilot experiments. This 
would provide opportunities for evaluation using a counterfactual, which would often be the 
prevalent payment mechanism. In such designs, it is particularly important to measure the potential 
positive effects of new mechanisms as well as their likely adverse effects, or gaming behaviours. For 
that, outcomes measured must go well beyond the subset of measures for which health providers 
are rewarded.  
More research into the feasibility of new mechanisms should be undertaken. Specifically, pilot 
projects could be used to investigate the organisational and logistical changes necessary to a good 
implementation. In addition, process evaluation implemented alongside such pilots would also help 
understand the positions of all stakeholders involved, and help identify foyers of resistance and 
potential solutions. In addition to contributing to the evidence base, pilot projects can also be used 
by policy-makers as a way to combat resistance to change, as it was done in Korea with a hospital 
payment reform [64]. 
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Research is also required on how best to implement financing policy reforms and the contextual 
determinants of success. Such research, based on realistic evaluation principles, also presents 
significant methodological challenges.  
Finally, for all interventions, a pressing research area lies in the development of costing studies, 
which could then pave the way to cost-effectiveness studies where effects can also be measured. To 
date, the impact of different provider reimbursement mechanisms on system efficiency is uncertain 
as few studies have compared the costs of different mechanisms and there are no cost-effectiveness 
studies. It is often unclear to what extent there might not be a trade-off between the costly (and 
sometimes poor) implementation of sophisticated mechanisms and the use of alternative more 
simple albeit imperfect mechanisms, in particular when capacity is inadequate. This might apply to 
hospital payment mechanisms (e.g. a comparison of global or line-item budgets and prospective 
case-based payments), as well as conditional cash transfers.  
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Table A1: Main characteristics of included reviews comparing salary, FFS and capitation 
 
  What the review authors searched for What the review authors found 
 Review objectives Search strategy Interventions Settings Study designs 
Gosden et al, 
 1999 [17] 
To determine the influence of 
salaried payment on doctor 
behaviour 
Systematic review of published 
and unpublished literature 
comparing salary to capitation 
or FFS 
19 studies in total.  
FFS vs Salary – 13  
Capitation + FFS vs Salary  – 2  
Salary + FFS vs Salary – 3 
Salary + Bonus vs Salary – 1  
US – 9 
Canada – 4 
Germany – 1 
Norway – 4 
South Africa - 1 
RCT – 1 
ITS – 2 
CBA – 1 
CC – 15 
Chaix-Couturier et 
al,  
2000 [174] 
To identify the results of 
financial incentives on costs, 
processes or outcomes of care 
Systematic review of all 
financial incentives, including 
provider reimbursement 
mechanisms 
89 studies in total. Financial 
incentives included salary, FFS, 
capitation (fundholding), and 
managed care contracts. 
Not enumerated 8 RCTs 
Other designs not 
enumerated. 
Gosden et al,  
2000 [41] [43] 
To review the impact of 
different payment methods on 
the clinical behaviour of 
primary care physicians 
Systematic review of published 
studies meeting EPOC criteria 
4 studies in total.  
Capitation vs FFS – 3 
Salary vs FFS – 1 
US – 2 
Canada – 1 
Denmark – 1 
 
RCT – 2  
CBA – 2  
Christianson  
et al, 
2007 [56] 
To review the secondary 
impacts on quality of care of 
financial incentives directed at 
reducing utilisation and costs 
Systematic review of published 
studies 
46 studies in total. 12 studies on 
physician incentives. Incentives 
included FFS, capitation, GP 
fundholding, and bonuses 
conditional on cost reduction. 
 Not enumerated For 12 physician studies: 
RCT – 3 
CC – 3  
Obs – 6  
RCT: randomised controlled trial; ITC: interrupted time series; CBA: controlled before and after; CC: controlled observational; Obs: observational study without controls
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Table A2: Summary of evidence from rigorous studies comparing salary, FFS and capitation 
 
Comparison Study Setting Study Design Outcomes Relative Differences Between Groups 
Enrolled patients • Salaried group 1.27 times more than FFS group ** 
Total visits per patient • FFS 1.18 x Salary ** 
Well-child visits per patient  • FFS 1.30 x Salary *** 
Emergency room visits per 
patient 
• Salary 1. 83 x FFS *** 
Continuity of care • FFS 1.10 x Salary ** 
Compliance with guidelines on 
number of visits 
• Missed visits: Salary 3.13 x FFS *** 
• More visits than recommended: FFS 1.74 x Salary *** 
S vs. 
Salary 
Hickson et al, 
1987 [44] 
USA 
Paediatric residents 
Paediatric patients 
RCT 
C: FFS 
I: Salary 
 
Patient satisfaction • No significant differences in overall satisfaction, satisfaction with 
humanness, satisfaction with continuity.  
• FFS lower satisfaction with access to physician than Salary ** 
Face-to-face consultations • FFS 2.31 x Capitation after 6 months ** 
Telephone consultations • FFS 2.21 x Capitation after 6 months ** 
Prescription renewals • FFS 0.21 x Capitation after 12 months ** 
Diagnostic services • FFS 7.19 x Capitation after 6 months ** 
Curative services • FFS 15.77 x Capitation after 6 months ** 
Referrals to specialists • Capitation 12.1 x FFS after 12 months ** 
Krasnik et al, 
1990 [45]; 
Krasnik & 
Gottschau, 
1993 [175] 
Denmark 
GPs 
 
CBA  
C: Capitation 
I: CapitationFFS 
 
Referrals to hospital • Capitation 17.0 x FFS after 12 months ** 
Visits per patient • Capitation 1.29 x Low FFS ** 
• High FFS 1.34 x Low FFS ** 
Referrals to specialists • Capitation 0.78 x Low FFS *** 
• High FFS not significantly different to Low FFS ** 
FFS vs. 
Capitation 
Hohlen et al, 
1990 [176]; 
Davidson et al, 
1992 [46] 
USA 
Primary care physicians 
Paediatric patients 
RCT 
C: FFS low rates 
I1: Capitation  
I2: FFS high rates 
Emergency room visits • Capitation 0.80 x Low FFS *** 
• High FFS 0.78 x Low FFS *** 
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Comparison Study Setting Study Design Outcomes Relative Differences Between Groups 
Hospital admissions • Capitation 0.73 x Low FFS ** 
• High FFS 1.35 x Low FFS ** 
Compliance with guidelines on 
number of visits 
• Capitation lower than FFS group ‡ 
Estimated average expenditure 
per person per year  
• Capitation $75.67 higher than Low FFS ‡ 
• High FFS $56.19 higher than Low FFS ‡ 
Doctor visits • Capitation 0.93 x FFS ** 
Emergency room visits • Capitation 0.90 x FFS ** 
Hospital admissions • Capitation 0.87 x FFS *** 
Patient satisfaction with care • No significant difference 
Average Medicaid expenditure 
per person per year 
• Capitation 0.78 x FFS ‡ 
Health status • No significant difference 
Lurie et al, 
1994 [47] 
USA 
Primary care doctors 
Elderly Medicaid patients 
RCT 
C: FFS 
I: Capitation 
Mortality rate in one year • No significant difference 
Hospital admissions • No significant difference  Hutchinson & 
Foley, 1999 
[48] 
Canada 
Primary care physicians 
CBA 
C: FFS 
I: FFS  Capitation 
Hospital inpatient days • No significant difference 
List size • No significant difference 
Consultation length • No significant difference 
Prescriptions • No significant difference 
Referrals • No significant difference 
Preventive care • No significant difference 
Salary vs. 
Capitation 
Gosden et al, 
2003 [19] 
UK 
GPs 
CBA 
C: Capitation 
I: Salary 
Patient assessment of quality of 
care 
• No significant difference 
RCT: Randomised controlled trial; CBA: Controlled before-and-after study; C: Control; I: Intervention; ***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; ‡: Statistical significance not reported 
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Table A3: Main characteristics of included reviews assessing evidence on hospital reimbursement mechanisms  
What the review authors searched for What the review authors found  
Review objectives Search 
strategy 
Interventions Settings Study designs 
Donaldson & 
Magnussen 
1992 [68] 
Reviewing the effects of 
Diagnostic-Related Groups on 
efficiency, quality of care, and 
costs.  
No information 
provided 
All 13 studies (reported in 18 
papers) included reported changes 
in the reimbursement of Medicare 
patients in the US, from FFS to case-
based payments 
United States, 
inpatient services in 
hospitals. 
 12 before and after studies, 2 of 
which use patient cohorts and 2 
of which compare Medicare 
patients to other patients. 
1 cross-sectional study 
Donaldson & 
Gerard, 1991 
[67] 
To review the empirical 
literature on how hospitals are 
reimbursed 
No information 
provided 
Global budgets and case-based 
payments. 
 Also reported are studies on the 
impact of ownership of hospitals 
and internal markets. 
United States, UK. 14 before and after studies. 
Chalkley and 
Malcomson 
2000 [69] 
To assess if the effects of 
recent reforms in the US and 
UK are consistent with theory  
No information 
provided 
Case-based payments. 
 
United States, 
inpatient services in 
hospitals. 
19 studies are referred to ; no 
information provided on their 
design, 
Carrin & 
Hanvoravongch
ai 2003 [36] 
To assess the potential of 
different instruments (incl. 
facility reimbursement 
mechanisms) for cost-
containment policies.  
No information 
provided 
Global budgets, case-based 
payments, per-diem and fee-for-
service. 
High-income 
countries 
11 studies are referred to ; no 
information provided on their 
design, but they appear to be case 
studies only. 
Rosenberg and 
Browne 2000 
[71] 
To trace the results of past 
research on the underlying 
factors of inpatient 
expenditures (incl. to highlight 
results from initial studies 
after the policy change ) 
No information 
provided 
 Case-based payments, more 
precisely the switch from FFS to 
DRGs for Medicare patients. 
United States, 
inpatient services in 
hospitals. 
 19 studies reported (for various 
outcomes), many using a before 
and after study design (but the 
study design is not systematically 
reported) 
Coulam and 
Gaumer 2000 
[72] 
To examine the literature on 
the effects of PPS on practice 
patterns, costs, and quality of 
patient care. 
No information 
provided 
Case-based payments. 
 
United States, 
inpatient services in 
hospitals. 
27 studies reported (for various 
outcomes), many using a before 
and after study design (but the 
study design is not systematically 
reported). 
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Table A4: Description of P4P schemes 
 
Country, scheme description and 
reference 
Measures Basis and attributes of payment Targeted services Purchaser 
UK (Quality and Outcomes Framework) 
 
National financial incentive scheme that 
remunerates general practices (primary care 
providers) for performance against a set of quality 
of care indicators. 
 
Doran, Fullwood et al (2008) [124] 
Process measures – assessment 
conducted, diagnostic tests 
conducted, drugs administered, 
immunisations given, referrals 
 
Outcome measures – intermediate 
outcomes 
Health provider awarded points on a sliding 
scale on the basis of the proportion of eligible 
patients for whom it achieves each target. No 
points are awarded over a maximum 
threshold. Each point is converted into a 
bonus payment (£126 in 2007). Providers’ 
income increased by 30-40% during scheme.  
Primary health services with 
focus on asthma, cancer, 
coronary heart disease, heart 
failure, chronic obstructive 
airways disease, diabetes 
mellitus, epilepsy, 
hypertension, hypothyroidism, 
severe mental health and 
stroke 
Government through the 
national health system 
US (Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration) 
 
Large pilot providing bonus payments to hospitals 
based on a composite measure of inpatient 
quality. 
 
Lindenauer, Remus et al (2007) [141] 
Process measures – assessment 
conducted, diagnostic tests 
conducted, drugs administered 
 
Outcome measures – inpatient 
mortality 
 
Hospitals performing in the top (second) 
decile on a composite measure of quality 
receive a 2% (1%) bonus payment in addition 
to usual Medicare reimbursement rate. 
Penalty of 1 to 2% of Medicare payment given 
to hospitals failing to exceed performance of 
year 1 hospitals in lowest two deciles. 
Bonuses averaged $72,000 per year. 
Heart failure, acute myocardial 
infarction, community-
acquired pneumonia, coronary 
artery bypass grafting, and 
hip/knee replacement 
Government via Medicare 
reimbursements 
Rwanda  
 
National scheme. Bonus payments to health 
providers based on quantity and quality of 
priority health services.  
 
Basinga, Gertler et al (2010) [74] 
Structural measures – availability of 
inputs, management, hygiene 
 
Process measures – clinical content 
of care such as tetanus vaccination 
during delivery care 
Payment is based on a fee for service (range 
$0.18 - $4.49) which is multiplied by a health 
facility quality index (range 0 – 1) to give final 
payment amount. Bonus payments increased 
health facility revenues by 22%. 
Curative care, prenatal care, 
family planning, delivery care, 
child growth monitoring, 
treatment of child nutrition, 
and vaccination. 
Government through the 
national health system. 
Nicaragua 
 
Pilot scheme. Bonus payments to health providers 
(hospital performance agreement) based on 
quality of service provision as part of broader 
scheme of contracting between government and 
health providers. 
 
Jack (2003) 
Structural measures – organisation, 
management  
 
Outcome measures – morbidity such 
as re-infection rates, patient 
satisfaction 
 
Payment is based on a quality index, which is 
a weighted total of the different quality 
measures. No payment is made if a threshold 
is not achieved. Above the threshold, amount 
of payment increases with quality index. 
Maximum bonus represents 17% of health 
facility revenues. 
Hospital health services. 
Specific services not stated. 
Government through the 
national health system. 
Taiwan 
 
National scheme. Monetary payments to health 
Process measures – treatment 
default rate, average length of 
treatment 
Payment is based on a points system whereby 
the hospital and physician gain points if they 
identify a case and then treat the case 
Tuberculosis Bureau of National Health 
Insurance in Taiwan 
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providers based on quality of tuberculosis 
treatment provided. 
 
Li, Tsai et al (2010) 
 
Outcome measures – treatment cure 
rate 
successfully.  
Cambodia 
 
Pilot scheme. Bonus payments to health providers 
based on quality of service provision as part of 
broader scheme of contracting between 
government and NGOs. 
 
Soeters and Griffiths (2003) 
Structural measures – punctuality of 
health workers, revenue from user 
fees (cost-recovery). 
 
Process measures – clinical content 
of care such as correct diagnoses and 
treatment 
 
Outcome measures – EPI coverage 
Punctuality incentive based on attendance at 
work. Cost-recovery incentive based on 
achievement of tiered thresholds. Basis for 
payment not stated for other measures. 
Performance incentives represent an increase 
of 500-800% in official income of health 
workers. 
Not stated. Only examples 
given – immunisation, 
tuberculosis treatment. 
NGOs through contracts with 
individual health providers. 
China 
 
Shanghai community health centres. Bonus 
payments given to health centres based on 
quality of care, cost containment and patient 
satisfaction 
 
Yip, Hsiao et al (2010) 
Structural measures – health records 
 
Process measures – clinical content 
of care such examinations, 
procedures, and patient advice  
 
Outcome measures – chronic disease 
management, patient satisfaction 
 
Cost containment – expenditure per 
visit 
Basis of payment not stated. 30%-50% of 
health centre budget withheld then given as 
bonus payment 
Immunisation, hypertension, 
diabetes mellitus, maternal 
and child health services 
Government district health 
bureau 
Burundi 
 
Pilot being scaled-up. Bonus payments to health 
providers based on quantity and quality of 
priority health services.  
 
Busogoro and Beith (2010) 
Structural measures – availability of 
inputs, management, hygiene 
 
Outcome measures –patient 
satisfaction 
 
Payment is based on a fee for service which is 
supplemented by an additional amount (up to 
15% of fee for service total) based on a quality 
of care index.  
Curative care, prenatal care, 
family planning, delivery care, 
HIV prevention, malaria 
prevention, treatment of child 
malnutrition, TB treatment, STI 
prevention 
NGOs through contracts with 
individual health providers. 
Purchaser is shifting to 
Government with nationwide 
scale-up 
Note: 1) This describes the scheme under individual health worker contracts as opposed to health facility contracts. 
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Table A5: Main characteristics of included reviews assessing evidence on P4P  
  
What the review authors searched for What the review authors found  
Review objectives Search strategy Interventions Settings Study designs 
Alshamsan 
et al (2010) 
To assess the impact of 
pay for performance on 
inequalities in the quality 
of health care in relation 
to age, sex, ethnicity and 
socioeconomic status 
Systematic search of English language 
literature in MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsycINFO and 
the Cochrane library. Reference list search of 
retrieved articles. Years between 1980 and 
2008, inclusive.  
22 studies identified, of which 20 
concern the QOF in the UK.16 studies 
use practice level data rather than 
patient level data. Socioeconomic 
status was the most frequently 
examined inequality 
Predominantly UK (20 
studies). 
Observational studies 
Christianson 
et al (2009) 
To assess the quality of 
the evidence relating to 
the relationship between 
financial incentives 
for providers and quality 
improvement. 
First step searched for high quality systematic 
literature reviews with wide range of search 
terms. Second step searched for specific 
studies with a wide range of study designs but 
limited number of search terms in the 
following databases: MEDLINE; Cochrane 
Central Register of Controlled Trials; EMBASE; 
EconLit. No language limits used. Years up to 
2006. 
 9 studies of targeted payments to 
physicians. 20 studies of broader 
schemes that reward physicians for 
quality improvement. 7 studies of 
schemes that reward institutional 
providers. 
Predominantly US (at 
least 23 studies), but 
also UK (9 studies), 
Spain, Australia. 
Randomised controlled trial, 
quasi-experimental study, 
controlled observational study, 
observational study with no 
control. 
Petersen et 
al (2006) 
To systematically review 
studies assessing the 
effect of explicit financial 
incentives for improved 
performance on 
measures of health care 
quality. 
PubMed search of English-language literature 
and reference lists of retrieved articles. Years 
up to 2005 
 2 studies of financial incentives at 
payment system level. 9 studies of 
financial incentives directed at provider 
groups. 6 studies of financial incentives 
for physicians. 
Not stated but review of 
references suggest 
mostly US. 
 9 randomised trials, 4 
controlled before and after 
studies, 4 cross-sectional 
studies 
Town et al 
(2005) 
To review studies 
assessing explicit 
economic incentives for 
preventive 
care targeted at specific 
individual providers, 
including direct payments 
or bonuses to the 
provider or his/her 
group.  
Authors searched EconLit, Business Source 
Premier, PsychInfo and MEDLINE. Reference 
lists were reviewed to identify other articles. 
The search focused on English language 
articles published up to 2002 Studies using 
interventions with multiple components were 
also excluded, as were studies that compared 
outcomes under different payment systems. 
5 studies with bonuses for reaching a 
target. 2 studies with per input bonuses 
for immunisation 
6 studies in the US 
primary health care 
system 
6 randomised trials 
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Rosenthal 
and Frank 
(2006) 
To review systematically 
the literature on paying 
for quality in health care, 
as well in other fields 
Authors searched MEDLINE, EconLit, ABI 
Inform, PsychInfo and the Social Science 
Citation Index. Additional citations were found 
by examining the reference lists of 
articles 
7 studies of payments for quality in 
health care 
[To be confirmed] [To be confirmed] 
Dudley et al 
(2004 
Tor systematically review 
literature of the evidence 
on strategies to support 
quality based purchasing 
Authors reviewed MEDLINE and Cochrane 
databases 
4 studies of performance based 
payments targeted at individual 
providers. 4 studies targeted at 
provider or group of providers 
Not stated Randomised controlled trials 
Mehrotra et 
al (2009) 
To review the literature 
on the current state of 
knowledge about the 
effect of P4P on clinical 
process measures, 
patient outcomes and 
experience, safety, and 
resource utilization in a 
hospital setting 
Not stated 8 studies identified  US Observational study with 
control 
Armour et 
al (2001) 
To systematically review 
the impact of explicit 
financial incentives at the 
physician level on 
resource use and quality 
measures 
Review followed an approach set forth in the 
Cochrane Collaboration handbook. Further 
details only available in an appendix that is 
available from the authors. 
Number of studies identified not stated. 
Financial incentive for improved 
delivery of preventive services,  
US, Northern Ireland Randomised controlled trial, 
observational studies with no 
control,  
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Table A6: Effects of P4P schemes 
P4P scheme 
Study design Outcome P4P effect Methodological limitations 
Rwanda 
 
Basinga, Gertler at al (2010) 
Quasi-experimental study 
(difference-in-difference 
estimator) 
 
Control group receives an 
equivalent amount of 
revenue not linked to 
performance. 
 
Prenatal care utilisation (=1) 
 
Institutional delivery care (=1) 
 
Quality of prenatal care 
 
Tetanus vaccine at prenatal visit (=1) 
 
Visit by child age 0-23 months (=1) 
 
Visit by child age 24-59 months (=1) 
 
Child age 12-23 is fully immunised (=1) 
0.002 (0.2%) 
 
0.01** (21.1%) 
 
0.14** (n/a) 
 
0.05** (7.6%) 
 
0.13*** (63.8%) 
 
0.11*** (132.5%) 
 
-0.07 (-10.5%) 
Problems in randomisation due to 
political decentralisation 
 
Potential confounding due to 
unobservables that change over time 
 
Limited set of outcomes 
Taiwan 
 
Li, Tsai et al (2010) 
 
Before and after Tuberculosis cure rate (=1) 
 
Average length of treatment for tuberculosis 
cases cured (days) 
0.16*** (34.3%) 
 
-6.5*** (-2.5%) 
 
No potential confounders other than a 
single time period controlled for. 
Taiwan 
 
Tsai, Kung et al (2010)  
Before and after Tuberculosis treatment default rate (=1) -0.04** (-26.9%) No potential confounders other than a 
single time period controlled for. 
Cambodia 
 
Soeters and Griffiths (2003) 
Before and after Delivery in health facility 
 
Two or more prenatal care visits 
 
Knowledge of 4 or more contraceptives 
 
Contraceptive use 
 
Child fully immunised 
 
Treatment of child diarrhoea with ORS 
0.165 (550%) 
 
0.222 (740%) 
 
0.47 (224%) 
 
0.164 (117%) 
 
0.279 (116%) 
 
0.166 (151%) 
No potential confounders other than a 
single time period controlled for. 
 
No significance test performed 
 
P4P incentives implemented in 
conjunction with other interventions 
UK (Quality and Outcomes 
Framework) 
Post-intervention 
longitudinal analysis 
Gap between least and most deprived quintile 
of practitioners in the proportion of patients 
Year 1: 0.04 
Year 2: 0.015 
With no baseline, pre-existing trends in 
inequality are not accounted for 
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Doran, Fullwood et al (2008) 
for whom clinical activity targets achieved (=1) Year 3: 0.008  
Deprivation score assigned on basis of 
practice location not patient residence 
UK (Quality and Outcomes 
Framework) 
 
Campbell, Reeves et al (2009) 
Interrupted time series 
analysis (shift in level and 
change in rate) 
Clinical quality for: 
Coronary heart disease (=1) 
 
 
Asthma (=1) 
 
 
Diabetes (=1) 
 
 
Continuity of care (=1) 
 
In 2005: 0.028* 
In 2007: -0.08* 
 
In 2005: 0.094** 
In 2007: 0.055* 
 
In 2005: 0.075** 
In 2007: 0.069** 
 
In 2005: -0.041** 
In 2007: -0.043** 
With only two pre-intervention 
observations, pre-existing trends not 
adequately controlled for 
 
No attempt to rule out (statistically or 
otherwise) other possible explanations 
for shift in level or change in rate 
US (Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration) 
 
Lindenauer, Remus et al (2007) 
Post-intervention 
longitudinal controlled 
analysis 
Process score for:  
Acute myocardial infraction (=1) 
 
Heart failure (=1) 
 
Pneumonia (=1) 
 
0.026*** 
 
0.041*** 
 
0.034*** 
Potential confounding due to 
unobservables that change over time 
 
 
US (Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration) 
 
Ryan (2009) 
Difference-in-difference 
analysis (hospital fixed 
effects estimator) 
Mortality for: 
Acute myocardial infraction (=1) 
 
Heart failure (=1) 
 
Pneumonia (=1) 
 
Coronary-artery bybass (=1) 
 
Cost for: 
Acute myocardial infraction (log) 
 
Heart failure (log) 
 
Pneumonia (log) 
 
Coronary-artery bybass (log) 
 
-0.002 (-0.9%) 
 
-0.000 (-0.3%) 
 
-0.001 –(0.8%) 
 
0.002 (4.8%) 
 
 
-0.006 (-0.6%) 
 
0.008 (0.8%) 
 
-0.006 (-0.6%) 
 
0.016 (1.6%) 
Potential confounding due to 
unobservables that change over time 
 
Note: *** denotes coefficient is significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. No standard errors are reported in Doran [2008] concerning the disparity in quality of 
care between providers. P4P effect in parentheses indicates relative effect 
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Table A7: Description of CCT programmes with health components  
Country, programme 
name and reference 
Target population Transfer size Conditionalities Parallel 
intervention(s) 
Brazil – Bolsa Alimentação [177] 
(national project) 
Poorest households from 
selected municipalities (chosen 
according to infant malnutrition 
prevalence). 
Up to maximum of US$18.25. 
US$6.25 per person beneficiary in the household 
(pregnant women or children under 7). 
For pregnant and lactating women: attending 
educational workshops, regular check-ups, and 
vaccinations up-to-date. 
For children under 7: maintaining vaccinations up-to-
date and growth monitoring. 
 
Children received nutrition 
supplements. 
Colombia – Familias en Acción 
[154, 161] 
(national project) 
Poorest households from 
selected municipalities (also 
chosen on poverty criteria). 
US$50 on average US$20 per family; US$6 per 
primary school child; US$12 per secondary school 
child. Approximately 30% of household consumption. 
For children under 7: attending health and nutrition 
check-ups.  
For children aged 8-18 year old: attending school.  
For mothers: attending health education workshops. 
 
Ecuador – Bono de Desarollo 
Humano [178] 
 
(national project) 
Children under 16 and 
households belonging to the first 
and second quintile of income 
US$15 per month per household; Senior and disabled 
heads of household receive US$11.50 per month 
 
For children aged 6-16 year old: attending school 
regularly (>80%). 
For children under 5: regular health post visits for 
growth and development checkups and 
immunizations. 
Institutional strengthening 
activities (strengthening the 
beneficiary selection system 
(SelBen) for social 
programmes). 
El Salvador - Red Solidaria [179] 
 
(national project) 
Children under 15 and expectant 
women from families living in 
extreme poverty within priority 
municipalities 
US$15 if eligible for health component only, US$20 if 
eligible for both health and education components, 
US$10 if eligible for education component only 
(between 15% and 18% of the minimum rural salary, 
bimonthly) 
For women: participating to training courses, and 
complying with basic protocol concerning 
preventative health 
For children aged 6-14 year old: attending school 
 
Strengthening of the education 
system (improving facilities and 
teaching material availability), 
and a US$19 million 
programme of contracting out 
NGOs to ensure the provision 
of basic health and nutrition 
services  
 
Honduras – Programa de 
Asignación Familiar [160] 
 
(national project) 
Children and women from poor 
households, living in designated 
beneficiary municipalities 
(chosen on socio-economic 
criteria). 
US$17 on average (US$4 per family, US$5 per child). 
Approximately 10% of household consumption. 
Attending primary school and regular health visits. 
 
- 
India – Janani Suraksha Yojana 
[152] 
(national project) 
Pregnant women belonging to 
poorest households, aged older 
than 19 years, and for up to 2 
live births (extended after the 
third live birth if the mother 
chooses to undergo sterilization 
immediately after the delivery). 
 
Rs700 in rural areas and Rs600 in urban areas. Attending at least 3 ante-natal and post-birth check-
ups and delivering in a public health facility 
(programme benefits are supposed to be extended 
to women delivering in private facilities too). 
In low-performing States (with 
low institutional delivery rates), 
an incentive is paid to the 
accredited health worker for 
each delivery (Rs600 in rural 
areas and Rs 200 in urban 
areas). 
Indonesia – Program Keluarga very poor households (to be Every household gets IDR 200.000 (US$ 18.2) per For pregnant or lactating mothers: 4 antenatal care  
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Harapan (PKH) [149] 
(pilot project) 
eligible to PKH, a household 
should meet at least 13 of the 14 
criteria defining poverty at the 
national level) which have 
pregnant women and/or under 
five children and/or children in 
school age3 
year as lump sum, and can receive conditional 
payments: IDR 800.000/year (US$ 72.7) for pregnant 
mother and under 6y child (no limit in the number of 
children) ; IDR 400.000/year (US$ 36.4) per 7-12 y old 
child ; 
IDR 800.000/year (US$ 72.7) per 13-15 y old child.  
visits and taking iron tablet during pregnancy ; Birth 
assisted by a trained professional ; 2 postnatal care 
visits for lactating mothers 
For under 6y children: complete childhood 
immunization and Vitamin A capsules twice a year ; 
monthly growth monitoring for infant 0-11 months 
and quarterly for children 1-6 years. 
For 6-15 y children: enrolment and regular 
attendance at school 
 
Jamaica – Programme for 
Advancement Through Health 
and Education [162] 
(national project) 
children under 17 years old, 
pregnant and lactating women, 
elderly over 65 years, destitute 
adults under 65 years. 
US$9/month per child eligible for education 
component, US$9/month per household member 
eligible for the health component. 
 
For children aged 6-17 year old: attending school. 
For other beneficiaries: complying with required 
health visits per year(number depends on beneficiary 
age and status). 
 
- 
Kenya [147] 
(small scale project) 
Poor households having Orphan 
and Vulnerable Children (OVC) 
aged 0-17 years old as 
permanent members. 
Ksh 1,000 (US$13.86) for households with <2 OVC, 
Ksh 2,000 (US$22.72) with 3-4 OVCs, and Ksh 3,000 
(US$42.58) with 5 or more OVCs. 
For children aged 6-17 year old: attending school. 
For children under 5: regular health centre visits for 
immunizations for children 0-1 years and for growth 
monitoring and vitamin A supplement for children 1-
5 years. 
 
Malawi [148] 
(small-scale project) 
Individuals doing a HIV test, in 
rural areas 
US$ 1.04 on average – vouchers of values between 
US$0-3 per individual were randomly assigned. 
Collecting HIV test result. - 
Mexico – Progresa (renamed 
Oportunidades) [159, 163]  
 
(national project) 
Eligible households (selected on 
poverty criteria) among selected 
communities (selected on 
poverty criteria). 
US$20 on average; US$13 per family; US$8-17 per 
primary school child; US$25-32 per secondary school 
child; US$12-22 grant once a year for school supplies 
- approximately 25% of household consumption. 
For children: attending primary and secondary school 
attendance; and complying with regular health visits 
and immunisation schedule. 
For pregnant women: complying with regular health 
visits and attending health education workshops. 
Children received nutrition 
supplements – allocation was 
not random and children in 
‘control’ areas could also have 
received them. 
Nepal – Safe Delivery Incentive 
Programme [151] 
(national project) 
Pregnant women with no more 
than 2 living children or an 
obstetric complication. 
1,500 NRs in mountain areas, 1,000 NRs in hill areas, 
500NRs in the lowlands (30-50% of the mean 
transport cost to the health facility). 
Giving birth in a public health facility. Trained health workers receive 
an incentive of NRs 300 for 
each delivery, and facilities are 
reimbursed NRs 1,000/delivery 
to recover the cost (as 
deliveries are free of charge for 
women). 
Nicaragua – Red de Protección 
Social [153] 
(small scale project) 
42 municipalities chosen to 
participate in the pilot phase: ½ 
randomly selected for 
intervention. 
US$25 on average US$18 per family; US$9 per family 
with school-age child; US$20 once a year for supplies. 
Approximately 20% of household consumption. 
For mothers of children under 5: attending 
educational workshops and bringing children to 
preventive health programmes 
For children aged 7-13 year old: attending school. 
The programme trained and 
contracted private providers to 
deliver the health services 
required. 
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Paraguay – Tekoporã [158]  Children aged 0 to 14 (including 
street children), and pregnant 
women in extreme poverty. 
 
Health and education transfer of US$5 per child aged 
0-14 years old (up to 4 children per household) + an 
additional US$10 per household.  
 
For children aged 25-60 months: attending 
educational centres (early stimulation). 
For children aged 5-14 years: attending basic 
schooling. 
For children aged 0-24 months: visits to health centre 
for growth/development monitoring. 
For children aged 25-60 months: visits for growth 
monitoring for children aged 5-14 years: medical 
check-ups and preventative dental care.  
For pregnant and lactating women: visits to health 
facility for pregnancy check-ups and post-partum 
control 
 
- 
Peru – Juntos [180] 
 
(National project) 
Children and pregnant or 
lactating women from poorest 
households in rural communities  
 
US$ 33 For children under 5: preventative health care visits 
for children 0-5 years.  
For pregnant and lactating women: complying with 
pre- and post natal care visits, attending nutrition 
training sessions.  
For children aged 6-14 years old: attending school. 
For all: obtaining birth certificates or ID cards (for 
individuals older than 18 years). 
 
- 
The Philippines - 
PantawidPamilyangPilipino 
Program (4Ps) [150] 
(pilot scaled up nation-wide) 
In poorest municipalities 
and the poorest 
barangays in cities  
 
P6,000 / year or P500 / month if households comply 
with the health conditions ; P3,000 / year or P300 / 
month per child for 10 months a year, to a maximum 
of 3 children per household if they comply with the 
education requirements. 
 
For pregnant women: complying with pre- and 
delivering with a skilled birth attendant and attend 
post natal care visits, 
Parents must attend various education seminars  
Regular preventive health checkups and vaccines for 
children aged 0-5 y old ; enrolment and regular 
attendance at schools for children aged 3-14 y old.  
 
 
Turkey – Social Risk 
Management Project [146] 
(small-scale project) 
poor families with children and 
pregnant women 
Bimonthly transfers of education: primary US$13 for 
boys, US$16 for girls; secondary US$20 for boys, 
US$28 for girls  
Bimonthly transfers of health: US$12 per month per 
child, US$12 per month during pregnancy, US$39 for 
birth at health centre. 
 
For school age children: attending school. 
For children aged 0-6 years: complying with regular 
visits to health clinics.  
For pregnant women: regular attendance to pre-
natal and post-natal check-ups and giving birth at 
hospitals. 
 
- 
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Table A8: Main characteristics of included reviews assessing evidence on conditional cash transfers 
  
What the review authors searched for What the review authors found  
Review objectives Search strategy Interventions Settings Study designs 
Lagarde et 
al. 2007 
[157] 
To critically review the 
evidence on the effects of 
CCTs on the uptake of health 
interventions 
Literature searched until 
April 2006; no language 
limit; 22 databases searched. 
Inclusion criteria: RCTs, BCA 
and ITS only. 
Cash transfers conditional on a mix of 
health and education requirements, or 
health-related behaviours only. 
Primary care services in Brazil, 
Colombia, Honduras, Malawi, 
Mexico and Nicaragua. 
Five cluster-Randomised 
Controlled Trials, and one 
controlled before-and-after 
study 
Glassman 
et al. 2007 
[155] 
To critically analyze CCT 
programs with respect to 
health and nutrition. 
No information provided Cash transfers conditional on a mix of 
health and education requirements. 
Primary care services in Brazil, 
Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico and Nicaragua. 
Three cluster-Randomised 
Controlled Trials, and one 
controlled before-and-after 
study 
Fiszbein, 
& Schady 
2009 [8] 
To review the evidence of 
effects of CCTs on health-
related outcomes (including 
health utilisation) 
No information provided, 
except on inclusion criteria 
(experimental and quasi- 
experimental evidence). 
 
Cash transfers conditional on a mix of 
health and education requirements. 
Primary care services in Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Turkey. 
Five randomised 
interventions, four quasi-
experimental studies (3 
regression discontinuity 
designs; one propensity score 
matching) 
Gaarder 
et al. 2010 
[156] 
To review the evidence of 
effects of CCTs on health-
related outcomes (health 
utilisation, health and 
nutrition) 
Builds on existing surveys 
and extensive search; 
inclusion criteria 
(experimental and quasi- 
experimental evidence). 
 
Cash transfers conditional on a mix of 
health and education requirements. 
Primary care services in Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Honduras, Malawi, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Nepal. 
Four randomised 
interventions, six quasi-
experimental studies (4 
regression discontinuity 
designs; one propensity score 
matching) 
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Table A9: Impact of CCT programmes on immunization coverage 
Programme  Outcome 
Initial rate 
(intervention 
areas) 
Final rate 
(intervention 
areas) 
CCT effect¶ 
Colombia – 
Familias en 
Acción [164] 
Probability of compliance with DPT 
vaccination, for children under 24 months old - - 0.089* 
 Probability of compliance with DPT 
vaccination, for children 24-48 months old  
- - 0.035 
 Probability of compliance with DPT 
vaccination, for children, over 48 months old 
- - 0.032 
Honduras – 
PRAF [160] 
% of children under age 3 vaccinated with 
DPT1/pentavalent 72.0 - 6.9*** 
 % of children under age 3 vaccinated for 
Measles 
84.0 - -0.2 
 Proportion of mothers vaccinated for tetanus 
toxoid  56.0 - 4.2 
Nicaragua – Red 
de Protección 
Social [153] 
% of children aged 12-23 months old with up-
to-date vaccinations 36.4 71.7 0.61 
% of children under 12 months old (at 
baseline) vaccinated for TB 
88.0 89.0 5.2*** 
Mexico - 
Progresa after 6 
months [163] % of children aged 12-23 months old (at 
baseline) vaccinated for Measles 
92.0 96.0 3.0** 
% of children under 12 months old (at 
baseline) vaccinated for TB 
88.0 92.0 
1.6 
 
Mexico - 
Progresa after 
12 months 
[163] 
% of children aged 12-23 months old (at 
baseline) vaccinated for Measles 
92.0 91.0 2.8 
*** indicates significance at the 1%level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.  
¶
 
The treatment effect represent the net effect, e.g. taking into account the comparison with control groups.  
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